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ABSTRACT
Cogn1t1v1am, according to which the mind is to be
characterized in terms of the brain's information processing
structure, haa recently gained some prominence in philosophy
of mind. A contemporary version of the representationalism
of Locke and Descartes, this outlook is tied to and
motivated by the widespread use of computational models in
both cognitive psychology arad artificial intelligence. My
thesis explores 80me problems for this cognitivistic outlook
which aria. from a consideration of the intentional or
semantic properties of mental states. The thesis consists
of three independent partsl
In the first section, I assess John Searle's claim that
the intentionality of brain states depends essentially on
their biochemical rather than computational properties. I
argue that his account depends on confusing cognitivism with
behaviorism, "qualitative cont.ent" with intentional
properties, and chemical properties with tha constraints
they place on interaction with the world. Furthermore, his
treatment of the semantics of mental states either fails to
answer the pertinent questions or e188 answers them
incorrectly.
In the second, I discuss two related problems for the
view that meaning is determined by cognitive structure.
First, in the context of the familiar "twin-earth" examples,
I argue against Tyler Burge's claim that natural kind terms
require fundamentally different treatment than explicit
indexical. like "I" and "now". Second, I evaluate Hilary
Putnam's suggestion that any attempt to faotor extension out
of meaning will leave one with no reasonable criterion for
sameness of meaning. I offer come criticism of Jerry
Fodor'. "denotational semantice" response to Putnam's
problem, and 8uggest an alternative approach.
The third section addresses the re\ationship of the
cognitiviet view of intentionality to that offered by
Hu••erlian phenomenology. Hubert Dreyfus, among others, has
pointed out important parallels between the "methodological
solipsiam" of cognitivism and HU88erl'& "bracketing", and
has ueed these parallels in arguing that putative problems
for the HU88erlian account also impugn the cognitivist's
position. I contend that he eXAggerates the problems for a
HU.8erlian account, and that 8~ch difficulties as he does
uncover may be avoided by cognitiv!sm.
Adv1eor.. Profe••ore Ned Block and Jerry Fodor.
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It must be confessed, moreover, that
Eerce2t1on and that which depends on it are
Inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is, by
figures and motIoos. Arid, supposing that there
w.re a machine so constructed as to think, feel
and have perception, we could conceive of it as
enlarged and yet preserving the same proportions,
80 that we might enter it as into a mill. And
this granted, we should only find on visiting it,
pieces which push one against another, be never
anything by which to explain a perception. This
must be sought for, therefore, in the simple
substance and not in the composite or machine. [1]
- Leibniz, The Monadology
I. Introduction
Intentionality is in again; it has resurfaced as a
leading contender for that special something which we have
but that the best of machines might yet lack. This
udirectedneS8 upon an object" and "having within itself a
content" which Brentano proposed as t..he identifying mark of
the mental haa, after a bit of a layoff, returned to the job
of isolating our own mentality from pretenders to the
title. Wha.t is this strange feature of "of-ness" had by
protopla8m but not silicon, wh~re does it come from, and why
18 it important?
In what follows, 1'11 examine a few of the iss\.les
surrounding this topic by inspecting some of the positions
and arguments of John Searle, one of the main combatants in
the current discussions, emphasizing in particular the
presentation given 1n his paper "Minds, Brains, and
Program.... [2] Searle taKes his central point in this
article to be the refutation of Wllat he calls "strong AI II I
the view that having a mind (intelligence, beliefs, etc.) is
just a matter of embodying a certain sort of cOlnputer
program -- of eng5ging in a particular kind of activity
which can be "defined 1n terms of computational operations
on purely formally defined elements." [3J The basic method
of argument consists in taking the reader through a series
of gedankenexperimenta, each of which purports to
present a candidate which some version of the "strong AI"
view would count as among the mindful. We are then implored
to accede in the intuition that the cases under
consideration provide counter-examples to the view in
question; for in each (we are assured), something 1s
missingl intentionality the juice of meaning- I'll
be avoiding much discussion of Searle's specifio examples;
rather than simply constructing imaginary cases and then
reading off our unexamined intuitions from them -- a blatant
80rt of "intuition pump" strategy -- I'll try to bring out
what 888m to be the underlying principles which might be
leading Searle to make the sorts of intuitive judgements
about the examples that he does, and consider their
plau8ibility and potential justifioation occasionally
through the use of additional examples.
It's important to get clear from the start on the
notion of instantiating the same computer progralll which
plays a central role in Searle's arguments, de it's
instantiating the same program (of whatever kind you like)
ra, say, I do, which Searle i8 intent on rejecting as being
itself sufficient for mentality. Now it sometimes looks
like Searle is using this notion in a fairly weak sense;
that i8, in the sense of something roughly like that of
computing the Bame function. Such a reading would
certainly mesh well with Searle's preoccupation with the
Turing test. (especially in the "Chinese room" example, where
the emphasis 18 centrally on the preservation of
input/output relationships), and would support his claim to
samene8S of program in the cases -- like the Chinese room
which get the strongest intuitive "no" vote on the presence
of mentality. Indeed, it sometimes looks as though all
Searle 1s actually concerned with is refuting something like
the Turing teet a8 providing a criterion for the mental; but
1f this is it, there would seem to be better arguments
around for the same conclusion. [4] As far as this
extremely weak notion of sameness of program goes -- a
notion which 18 essentially a behavioristic one -- I for
one am perfectly willing to accept his cases as
counterexamples to "strong AI", two things having the same
input/output relations of whatever 80rt you like -- is
perfectly compatible with one having a mind and the other
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But I think that it's clear there's a straightforward
and natural notion of sameness of program which is much
stronger than this, and which is the one Searle is actually
concerned with. The weaker notion 1s the one relevant to a
behavioristic account of mind; but it's this stronger
notion which is central to 4 position which Searle i8
clearly interested in refuting as well. This is the outlook
of cognitivisml (very roughly) the view that there is a
true cognitive theory of the way we pro~es8 information, and
that it is in virtue of our falling under such a theoretical
description that we have mentality. Now a rough-and-ready
characterization of this stronger notion of sameness of
program isn't too hard to get. it requires not only
computing the same function, but doing it in the same way.
Of course this is admittedly quite vague, and "in the same
way" of course needs to be fleshed out a bit; surely the
cognitivist doesn't want it to come to "by using the same
physical mechin1sms." Nonetheless, the intuitive idea for
the cognitivist is, I think, pretty olear. to process
information in the same way is to instantiate a sort of flow
chart describing the information flow between primitive
"black box" processors which manipultlte representations and
pass them among themselves. Howe vex' this is to be filled
out, this muoh seems clear. It is the stronger notion which
Searle i8 actually concerned in refuting as providing a
criterion for the mental, and given this, instantiating a
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program which I instantiate and in virtue of which I have
mentality will involve the preservation of some plausibly
significant aspect of my internal structure.
Now Searle claims throughout his discussion of this
issue that IJreservation of our brain' 8 chemical
structure (or what would presumably entail that -- ita
microphysical structure) is sufficient for the
preservation of mentl\ll ty. Of course for Sear le, samerless
of chemical structure isn't in any sense a functional
property, rather, it requires sameness of underlying
stuff. As far as preservation of mentality via sameness
of program rather than stuff goes, Searle considers
two main candidates which we might call cognitive and
neural equivalence. The forme: 1s just what you1d
think: for something the be cognitively equivalent to me, it
must accomplish i'\:,8 information processing in the same way I
do. That 1s, pick your favorite (true) theory of the way
which I process information uf the general sort that
c09n1~1ve psychologists would like to provide, 1n terms of
computations defined over representations accomplished by
the primitive "black boxes" and their 1nterrelEltions; then
cognitive equivalence requires that this theory be true of
the entity in question as well.
As for what I am oalling neural equivalence, the
matter is slightly less straightforward. In the sense
1nten4ed here, neural eq~1valence to me does not require
that the entity in question have a neural system which falls
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under the same sorts of physico-chemical descriptions as
does mine; rather, it requires that the entity instantiate
some description of my neural system which characterizes
neurons by their functional relations with each other. Such
a description might characterize the functional
relationships between neural firings, kinds of synaptic
transmissions, etc., but would not determine the sorts of
physical and chemical processes wta1ch would have to underlle
such activity. Put slightly differently, we might think of
neural equivalence in the intended sense as involving
falling under the same sort of "black. box" theory as is
involved in the notion of cognitive equivalence; the
difference being that in this case the primitive black boxes
would correspond to individual neurons. In what follows,
however, I'll confine my attention to the question of
cognitive equivalence, and will use the more general
"computational equivalence" to refer only to th is case.
Most (but not all) of what I say applies to this functional
neural isomorphism as well; but surely it's the issue of
cognitive equivalence which is more interesting, if for no
other reason than it would seem to be central to the
ideology of cognitive science in a way that neural
equivalence is not central to any scientific ideology. [5]
We might then put what would seem to be a central
pillar in ft view such as Searle' s in the followil19 way:
Neither oognitive nor neural equivalence with a normal human
being i8 itself sufficient for mentalitY1 something could
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have either or both of these and yet fail to have the mark
of the mental intrinsic intentionality. It is, on
Searle's account, the sort of preservation of structure
which is involved in cognitive and neural equivalence which
is to be picked out by the notion of instantiating th~
.ame computer program; and it is just this sort of
preservation of structure which is held by Searle to be
itself insufficient for mentality.
Before moving on to the substantive claims and
arguments offered, let me note here that the sort of alleged
problem which Searle is trying to put forth fot' the
cognitivist might also be stated, instead of in terms of
"strong AI" and computer programs, in terms of the doctrine
of psychofunctionalism and the problems of
liberalism and chauvinism for functionalist accounts
of the mental in general. [6] Psychofunctionalism (roughly,
the view that to have a mind is -- put in the terminology at
hand just to be cognitively equivalent, more or lese, to
a normal human being) is, viewed one way, a strategy for
revising a more general functionalist kind of viaw in order
to escape problems of liberalism; i.e., counting among the
mindful candidates which should clearly be ruled out. Now
Psychofunctionalism considered as specifying the nature of
the mental is surely chauvinistic in rUling out entities
which may not share our particular kind of cognitive
structure, but may have a good claim to mentality
nonetheless. But the cogni tiviet (or "strong AI" pacti sarl) ,
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by only purporting to give a sufficient condition for
mentality, avoids this problem with chauvinism, which at the
same time allowing himself the option of suggesting as a
sufficient condition (at least for starters) a specification
of internal structure which fur the Psychofunctionalist (who
wants necessary and sufficient conditional would be
absurdly chauvinistic, e.g., perfect computational
equivalence to some particular human being- Given this, we
might restate Searle's objection to cognitivism as this:
Even such an absurdly chauvinistic criterion as this is
still too liberal as well-
II. Intentionality, Consciousness, and Brains in Vats
Behind the intuition pump and the Chinese room, it is
the issue of content on which Searle's position rests.
For, he claims, at least some mental states are essentially
contentfuli or as he would put it, intrinsicallY
intentional. But surely, he adds, formal symbol
mainipulations are not by themselves meaningful at all.
Thus, the reason that program is itself insufficient for
mentality:
Because the formal symbol manipulations by
themselves don't have any intentionalitY1 they are
quite meaningless 1 they aren't even symbol
manipulations, since the symbols don't symbolize
anything. In the linguistic jargon, they have a
syntax but no semantlcs. [7J
One common response to this challenge of Searle's to
say where apparently uninterpreted symbols might get some
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sort of meaning is to hold that they get their
interpretation from their causal interactions with the
ouside world. As William Lycan puts it in his commentary on
Searle's acticle:
••• no computer has or could have intentional
states merely in virtue of performing sytactic
operations on formally oharacterized
elements.... Our braIn states do not have the
contents they do just in virtue of having their
purely formal properties either; a brain state
described "sytactically" has no meaning or content
of its own. In virtue of what, then, do brain
states (or mental states however construed) have
the meanings that they do? Recent theory advises
that the content of a mental representation is not
determined within the owner's head; rather, it is
determined in part by the objects in the
environment that actually figure in the
representation's etiology and in part by social
and contextual factors of several other sorts. [7]
Thus (on this line) a substantial part of Searle's point is
granted: formal symbol manipulation of whatever sort you
like is not itself sufficient for intentionality; you also
need these formal structures to have the right kind of
causal (perhaps contextual in general) relationships to the
outside world to get them interpreted. One might say that
the interpretation and hence the intentionality of the
formal system's statBs and representations comes from its
dasein. [9] But Searle will have none of this. For, he
claims, "that the internal operations of the brain ar~
causally sufficient for mental phenomena is fairl( evident
from what we do know." [10] What we know that makes this
evident, he goes on to say, are such things as that (with
respect to some visual experienoe of a tree) "J could be
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having exactly that visual experience even if there were no
tree there, provided only that something was going on in my
brain sufficiel .. t to produce the exper ience." [11] Perhaps
unsurprisingly, we find lurking behind this "knowledge"
everyone' s favorite twent.ieth-century versJ.on of Cartesi.an
doubt: "If I were a brain in a vat I could have exactly the
same mental states I have now 1 i. t is just the most of them
would be false or otherwise unsat.isfied." [12]
Note, however, that Searle needs here (at least) what
might be called the "strong" brain-in-a-vat intuition: not
only might I be a brain in a vat now and have these very
same mental (and intentional) states, but I might still have
had these very same intentional states had I never beeu
anytlling but a brain in a vat. Since for Searle, the
fact that our mental states have the content they do ls, as
it were, a purely internal (to the brain) matter (as he
aays, a matter of the brain's biochemistry), these
states must then have their content even if they are
~tally divorced from any sort of causal connection with
the world through which they might marlage to aql.1eeze a
little content. We might then imagine that rather than
having the infamous mad scientist kidnap someone and remove
her brain for his heinous experiment in semanti~B, we
instead have the whole mesa -- brain, nutrient bath, and
"evil demon" computer -- materialize out in space franl the
random motions of particles. [13] We can thus (at least try
to) avoid the possibility that the brain is somehow
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"coa8~in9 on lef~over daaein", the pOds1bility of any
obvious sort of teleological or ~volutionary story about
content would thereby appear to be ruled out as well. [14]
J£ we were to grant Searle all this, we would then seem
to be faced with the followin9 problem; Brains don't need
des.in for their intentionality; aome kind of
-
content 18 guaranteed by their internal operation. But
surely, we are urged, no such thing 1s true of a formal
symbol manipulator as such; the only sort of
interpretation which ita states and 8ymbo~8 get must come
from the outside. As George8 Rey has pointed out, a
computer might well run through exactly the same
computational states on two days, but have ita inputs and
outputs be intI:, .·nreted on one day as being about, say, the
SALT talks, and on the next day as being about a chess game,
"It'. jU8t that on Wednesday the punches in the cards a~e
interpreted (say, by Carter) to refer to Brezhnev, Vienna,
and lOO-megaton bombs; and on Thursday the very SAme punches
are interpreted (aay, by Spa8sKy) to refer to moves and
piec•• in che8S." [15] Aa far a8 the computer is
concerned, there juat ien't any difference. ThU8 (a8 Searle
would have it) , whereas brains have intrinsic
intent1onalltx, fo~mal symbol manipulators as such are
only the objects of ob8erver~relative ascriptions of
intentionality. "a manner of speaking about the
intentionality of the obeervers", which 18 "always dependent
on the lntr1n.lc 1ntentionality of the observers." [16J And
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a8 f~.r as mentality is concerned, the latter sort of
intentionality is (on Searle's line) no intentionality at
alll
••• the mental-nonmental distinction cannot be just
in the eye of the beholder but it must be
intrinsic to the system •••• [17] There are not
two kinde of intentional mental states, there is
only one kind, thoae that have intrinsio
intentionality, but there are ascriptions of
intentionality [i.e. the observer-relative ones]
in which the ascription does not ascribe intrinsic
intentionality to the subject of the
ascription. [18]
t this point, the following q~est1on needs to be
asked I What's behind the intuition that the states of the
brain in a vat have some kind of intrinsic inner content?
S'lrely one central underlying intuition for Searle hera is
that this sort of content either i8 or is fundamentally
derivative from the content of consciousness, Now if
this i8 where the intrinsic intentionality of thd brain's
representational states 18 to come from, then at least
Searle's in good company. The intentionality of
consciou8ness has had an illustrious history of demarcating
the realm of the mentAl, and the phenomenological tradition
aa a whole, having taken the issue of intentionality for its
own, would apparently point us towArd just this sort of
view, on which the connection between intentionality and
conacioune88 i8 ~- to say the least -- intimate. As Husserl
writ.s.
What forms the materials into intentional
experience. and bring- in the specific element of
The Chemistry of Intrinsic Intentionality page 17
intentionality is the same as that which gives its
specific mealling to our use of the term
"consciousness", in accordance with which
consciousness points eo ipso to some thing of
which it is the con8~iou8ness.... Consciousness
is just consciousness "of" something 1 it 1s its
essential nature to conceal "meaning" within
itself •••• [19]
Or as Sartre more simply puts it I "Indeed, consc1ousrles8 1.8
defined by intentionality." ["0]
Now I'm not claiming that Searle 18 actually conunitting
himself to this sort of explicit equation of consciousness
and intentionality; however, what he does say about the link
between consciousness and intentionality sU9gests strongly
that although the equation may not be there, the intimacy
surely is. In his article "What is an Intentional State?",
he's fairly explicit about this.
What I actually believ~ to be the case ... is
something like the following: only beings capable
of conscious states are capable of Intentional
states.... And though any given Intentional
state, such as a belief or a fear, may never be
brought to consciousness, it is always in
principle possible for the agent to bring his
Intentional states to consciousness. [21)
Thus Searle is clearly holding that not only consciousness,
but also conscious access to one'8 intentional states is
prerequi8ite to intentionality. Notice that this connection
18, ~nce seen, apparent thoughout much of what he says in
the "Minda, Brains, and Programs" responses I e,g., "I could
have made the argument about paine, tickles, and
anxi.ty ...... [22], "To interpret the symbol he would have to
have eome awareness of the causal relation ••.. " [23]
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Indeed, many points made in the course of this discussion in
terms of "knowing that" or "understanding that" become much
clearer when it is kept in mind that for Searle, these sorts
of relationships are going to presuppose potential, if not
reali~ed, "consciousness of".
We can now see what at least part of the "causal
powers" had by the brain (in virtue of its internal
operations) necessary to its ability to secrete the juice cf
meaning area the power to produce conscious mental states
which have the right sort of relationship to the semantic
properties of the intentional states of the brain (or
organism). Now as intrinsic intentionality is, for Searle,
the mark of the mental, it's not 8urprising that it's bound
up with consciousness in an important way; intuitions about
consciousness are, after all, central to anyone's
pretheoretic notion of mind. However, as it's semantic
properties which Searle thinks are essentially lacking
without the right biochemistry, it's worth considering just
how the semantic properties of the representational states
of the brain the properties of meaning and being
about certain things, of having particular referents and
truth conditione are supposed to be intrinsioally bound
up with the internal operations of the brain, including the
power it has to produce conscious mental states of the sort
we have.
Now aa Searle puts it at one point, the underlying idea
here i. 80mething like the following I
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The brain is all we have for tIle purpose of
representing the world to ourselves and everything
we can use muut be inside the brain. Each of our
beliefs must be possible for a being who is a
brain in a vat because each of us is precisely a
brain in a vat, the vat 1s a skull and the
'messages' coming in are coming in by way of
impacts on the nervous system. [24]
But one question which needs to be asked is precisely the
one which is begged here. From the assumption that mental
processes must use only "internal" properties of the brain,
does it follow that the representational states of the brain
cannot have semantic properties which alen't reflected
in the biochemical properties of the repre8e~tation8? Can
it make a difference what the signals are coming from? And
for those which are 80 reflected, is it clear that chey
are not also reflected in the computational properties of
the representations? I'll now turn to a discussion of
Searle's position on semantics with an eye toward answering
theBe questions.
III. Semantics (1). Indexicals
Now on one straightforward reading of what Searle has
to 8ay about the sort of contribution his "intrinsic
intentionality" makes in the fixation of the "aboutness"
relatione of mental 8tates such as meaning, reference,a and
truth conditions, he would appear to be holding an absurdly
strong vereion of the (these days 80mewhat disoredited) view
that meaning is "in the head", For he does claim that (1)
"[mental repr••entationa] are defined in terms of their
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content" [25]; (2) "the [intentional] object of a mental
[representation] 1s just the actual object or state of
affairs represented by [the rplevantly related] intentional
staten [26]; (3) "any (mental] representation is 1ntel~nally
related to its [intentional] object in the sense that it
could not be ~ representation i.f it did not have THAT
object" [21]; and (4) "it is the operation of thft brain al1d
not the impact. of the outside world that matters for the
contents of our intentional states," [28) On what looks
like the moat natural r&ading of all this, the view
presented would seem to be vulnerable to the following
obviou8 sort of counterexample; Surely everything in my
head might be the same on each of two occasions where I
think. "That man is a spy", but the situations differ in that
on one occasion I was looking and pointing at Ralph (and
thu8 referring to him), and on the other I was looking
and pointing at Sam, Ralph's identical twin brother (and
thus referring to him). To whom live referred depends
on who's actually there. But we're then, I take it, quit~
inclined to ~ay that if these thoughts have states of
affaire as intentional objects, the former thought's
intentional object is the state of affairs consistin9 in
Ralph'. being a spy, and the latter thought's
intentional object is the state of affaire consisting in
Sam'. being a spy. Hence, on the reading at hand,
what's in the head (at least in Searle's senae) doesn't
fUlly determine the intentional objects of mental states,
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and thus can't fUlly determine the content of such states
either -- directly contradicting (4).
I think that the misleading claim among the four cited
is (3). In his article "Intentionality and the Use of
Language" (from which claim (3) was taken), Searle seems to
significantly weaken this thesis (at least implicitly) soon
after advancing it. Indeed, on the very next page,
immediately after makina claim (2), he goes on to say that
"1.£ there is no such actual object 01:< state of affairs
represented then the intentional state does not have an
intentional object though it does still contain a
representation." [29] Given the intimate Bart of
relationship between content and object required by thesis
(3), one is immediately prompted into wondering what ~tate
is "the" state Searle is talking about; if having the same
intentional object is required in order to be the same
intentional state, there just can't be anyone state which
mayor may not have an intentional object.
Searle's position is not quite this easy to defeat,
however. The trick here (and the position Searle clearly
intends) is to read (3) as being about tokens of
intentional states rather than types. Each token mental
state here is taken to be in a certain sense
"se:"f-referential", and it i8 this which allows the type
identical mental states to have different intentional
objects -- indeed, to have different contents. This move is
made moet ctearly in Searle's book, Intentionality. An
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Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Here, in considering
an example involving the intentiorlal i ty of visual
perception, the point is put like this:
••• type-identical visual experiences can ~ave
different conditions of satisfaction and therefore
different Intentional contents. Two
"phenomenologically" identical experiences can
have different contents because each experierlce is
self-referential. Thus, for example, suppose two
identical twins have type-identical visual
experiences while looking at two different but
type-identical station wagons at the Siime time in
type-identical lighting conditions and surrounding
contexts. Still, the conditions of satisfaction
can be different. Twin n\lmber one requires a
station wagon causing his visual experience and
twin number two requires a station wagon causing
his numeri~ally different visual experience. Same
phenomenology 7 different contents and therefore
different conditions of satisfaction .... [30] The
conditions of satisfaction are: that there is a
yellow station wagon in front of X and the fact
that there is a yellow station wagon in front of X
is causing the visual experience. [31]
Given this, the treatment of the earlier example is
fairly straightforward. Although I have type-identical
mental states in the two cases, the contents of the tokens
differ in that eaoh makes explicit direct reference to
itself a particular token mental state. In each case,
the conditions of satisfaction might be stated roughly as
"there is a man over there causing this (token) experience
and ..... , but the differenoe in reference of "this (token)
experien~~ett allows the two to have different con,jitions of
satisfaction and thus different intentional object~s.
However, we're not out of the woods yet. Even if tIle
general idea of this sort of analysis is accepted, there is
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a clear way in which representational content in the present
sense doesn't fUlly determine intentional object. What is
actually referred to still depends on the external context
of the token mental state. If I'm hallucinating, then my
thought has no intentional object; if Sam's there, then it's
him; and if Ralph's there, it's him. There's at least some
inclination to say something like this: Pick one of the two
token thoughts involved in our puzzle. Now why shouldn't we
say that that very token doesn't fully determine an
intentional object? ~fter all, in different possible
external contexts that token would picK out different
objects.
What's misleading here is the reference to the
intentional object as that object. To avoid the present
problems, thesis (3) clearly must be taken as concerning the
intentional object as given via a particular description and
not as simply concerning that very object. Of course my
token state could be that very one even if it didn't have
the man who is in fact causing the experience (i.e. Ralph)
as its object, but it must have as its object whatevBr man
happens to cause the experience. The necessity of (3) is,
to put it in a way Searle doesn't like, de dicta with
respect to a characterization of the conditions of
satisfaction rather than (de re) concerning the object
which in fact satisfies such co~ditions. The object of the
state in question must be the man (if there is one) standing
in front of me causing that very experience; but it needn't
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be Ra1eh, even though he is in fact tha t marl.
However, if this is the way (3) is to be handled, it's
not only stated a bit misleadingly, but it's also ~omewhat
vapid. Of course, given a specification of the conditions
of satisfaction of an intelltional eta te, a token couldl) • t
even be a state of that type unless it had as object
whatever (if anything) meets those condi tiona. It' S flot, on
this approach, the rapresentational content alone which
makes one thought about Ralph and the other about Sam; it's
alao the fact that the external world is set up in such a
way that it's Ralph who happens to be the man who is in fact
causing that experience. It would then seem that, at least
in this kind of case involving explicit indexicals, content
will only fix reference given an external context; and
so at least this aspect of "aboutness" is not captured by
"representational content" in Searle's sense.
But surely fixing referents for indexicals is
problematic on most anyone's account; and it's been a
standard move in philsophy of language to separate
"intension" (in the sense of something like cognitive
significance) from fixatioll of reference for such terms. As
long as we have in hand a semantic characterization of the
intentional state which fixes the referent, and some
reasonable characterization of what external factors are
relevant to the reference of indexicala (like what's around
at the moment), things don't seem so bad. Indeed, any
semantic aocount of a "psyoholog1cal states in the narrow
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s~nse" (which the cognitivist would seem to want as well)
mu~t find a way to deal with the proolem of explicit
index1cals. What either sort of view needs in answering
questioflS as to what indexicals are "about" is to give a
kind of relativization to a conte).t of something like the
de re reading of thesis (3). How~ver, what I hope to
show now is that for Searle, the kind of problem found here
is going to turn out to be contagious in such a way that far
more than the explicit indexicals are affected.
IV. Semantics (2): Non-indexicals
Let me illustrate this by means of a variant on the
"inverted spectrum" case. I think that the sort of
.. inverted intentionality" s1tuation created j~or Searle here
goes far beyond this sort of spectrum inversion case -- I'll
say a bit more about this later. However, I think that this
particular sort of example provides a good illustration of
the problems involved here.
Consider the following crazy sort of case. [32] A few
centuries down the road, we stumble upon a planet which has
the peculiar property of having its colorations reversed; or
to make thil198 simple, just green and red I the planet looks
just like Earth in every way you like except that "grass" is
red, "roses" are green, and so on. Furthermore, the
inhabitants of this planet have bodies and brains just like
ours, .;ith only the following exception; red/green color
inverting lenses naturally cover their eyes, so that tl"e
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color inversions in their world are, to put it a bit
misleadingly, righted when an alien looks at his
(green) roses, he has exactly the same type of physical
events occur in his brain as WOllld some doppe1sanger of
his on Earth upon looking at his (red) roses. Of
course, to get it so that everything in the brains of a
pair of doppelgangers is the same in such a situation,
we could suppose that some of our aliens speak a language
which is just like English, except that in their language,
the word 'red' is associated with the color of their roses
and apples (which are, recall, green), and 'green' is
associated with the color of their grass and trees (which
are red). [33]
Now consider such a pair of doppelgangers 1 call the
Earthling 'Bob E. It and the alien 'Bob A. It. Now if Bot> E.
looks at something red and thinks to himself "That's red",
then the conditions of satisfaction of his intentional state
involve their being a red object in the world causing
his visual experience; 1f his thought is tr\le, there must be
a red object so situated. But if Bob A. were to have
exactly the same things occur in his brain (and thus have a
conscious experience with, as we might put it, the same
phenomenological oharacter as Bob E. 's), surely the
conditions of satisfaction of hi! intentional state
involve there being a green object in the world which is
the cause of his visual experience. Green objects are just
the ones Bob A. (and the other aliens) always pick out by
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the word 'red' and the phenomenological character lin~ed
with it.
What the inverting lenses, inverted world coloration,
and language alteratioll have done is to mPlnipuate the
head/world relationship so trldt thoughts which are
instantiated by type identical brain states and have the
same phenomenological charact..er are about (or "directed
upon") red wIlen thought by an Earthling, and about
green when thought by an alien. 'Red' in the alien's
language refers to indeed, means the same thing
that 'green' does in English (and vice versa), in spite of
the fact that the brain states and phenomenological
characters linked with each word are the same in the two
cases. So, we again have a case where type identity of
brain state is compatible with difference in conditions of
satisfaction of intentional state; and rather than involving
explicit idexicals, for which cognitive significance and the
fixation of reference have long been seen as requiring
separation, it involves color terms -- terms used to pick
out what are paradigmatic examples of "secondary"
properties.
One very bad option for responding to this would be
simply to reject the central claim of the foregoing
argument, i.e., to deny that the aliens actually mean and
refer to green by their use of 'red', and that the state Bob
A. has which has exactly the same phenomenological character
as that caused in Bob E. by his seeing a red objeot is
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actually about or directed upon a green object (even though
those are the kind that typically cause that state in him).
I take it that there is something patently absurd in such a
line. The aliens satisfy any sort of criterion of use you
like for referring to green things by their use of 'red'
(e.g., consistently pointing at green things and saying
"That's red"). In any straightfor'IIard sense, it's clear
that they have learned to use 'red' to pick out green
things, and use 'red' in just the way we use 'green'; it
would be small consolation to little alien Johnny, blurting
out between sobs, "But I wanted a red one, not a
green onel" to be told that he was mistaken, and that he
had gotten what he wanted after all. And of course, the
situation is entirely symmetrical: the alien Searle would
have all the same sorts of justification for claiming that
it's those Earthlings who've gotten it wrong; Earthling
Johnny wuld fare no better there than would his
doppelganger here. Surely for us or for the alie~s,
such an account reeKs of the wildest sort of chauvinism.
This sort of move would seem to epitomize exactly
what's wrong with what Putnam has called "magical" theories
of reference accounts whioh hold that the reference
relation obtains purely in virtue of some Wholly
unexplainable (henoe "magical") connection between (~ertain
sorts of representations (on Searle's story, the
intrinsically intentional ones) and the objeots of those
representations, totally independently of any kind of causal
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or contextual link. [34] Problems involving such "magical"
theories of referen~e and the consequences of rejecting them
are extremely interesting, but (1 hope) a bit outside the
scope of the present paper. However, let me note just one
point here which is particula,rly relevant to the preuent
discuesion. 011 8u~h a "magical" line, it apparently could
be the caee that we're the ones who have gotten it
wrong, and that, say, the phemon,enolog1eal character which
1. typically caused in me by my looking at ~ thing8 i8
actually "magically" linked up with gree~ things
inatead. But 8urely it 8eeme aa though this is the sort of
thing that we can't have gotten wrong -- at least not
becau8e we turn out to be (soruehow) like our aliens. To
cOlIII\it one~.:" . to this much is, furthermore, not to buy onto
any 80rt of radical anti-realism; it's not to hold thut we
couldn't end up "getting things wrong" in some way
regardl... of our 8ce1nt1fic successe8, but just to hold
that the particular sort of difference between the aliena
and our••lv.. 1.n f t the kind which could affect what our
word. and thought. refer to and are true and false of.
So I take it that a line 11ke this 1. out, and that it
muat be acknowledged that our aliena ~ refer to green
by their u•• of the word 'red' and the phemomenolog1oal
character linked with that word (in them a8 well as in us).
We already have on. kind of ca.. for which phenomenology
do••n't fUlly determine conditions of 8atisfaction, and
Searle i. perfectly prepared to live with this, ae he
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admit., "a man and his Doppelganger can be
type-identical down to the last micropart1cle, and their
Intentional contents can still be different, they can have
different conditions of satisfaction." (35J The problem 18
then first of all to show how to subsume this new case under
the "self-referential" move.
How 8uch a move 18 to go is fairly obvious, The general
idea ia of course to hold that the conditione of
satisfaction of Bob E.'s thinking "That's red" involve there
being the sort of thing which typically looks red to him
causing his visual experience; and the conditione of
satisfaction of Bob A.'s phenomenologically identical
thought involve there being the sort of thing which
typically looks red to him
-
(1.e. a green thing)
cau8ing his visual experience. Indeed, a move very much
like this is offered by Searle in an attempt to answer
Putnam'. "Twin-Earth" case from "The Meaning of Meaning", in
which doppelgangera of oura on "Twin-Earth" refer to
80mething different tha we do by 'watet' because the stuff
which plays the role of water (fills lakes, good for
drinking, etc.) is actually a different chemical substance.
Searle's line.
The indexical definition given by Jones on earth
of 'water' can be analyzed as follows I 'water' is
defined indexioally as whatever is identical in
atructure with the stuff causing this visual
experience, whatever that struoture~ And the
analy8ia for twin Jones on twin earth iSI 'water'
i. 4efinod indexioally aa whatever ie identical I n
.cruct~r. with the stuff causing this visual
experience whatever that structure ie;--ThU8, in
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each ca8e we have type-identical experiences,
type-identical utterances, but in fact something
different 18 meant. That 1s, in each case the
conditions of satisfaction established by the
mental content (in the head) is different because
of the causal self-referent1ality of perceptual
experiences. [36J
Now I think that there are deep and special puzzles
involving the meanings of natural-kind terms, and I'm going
to avoid them here. [37J But at least this much is
obviously wrong with the portion of Searle's account given
here. Surely the meaning of 'water' isn't just "same k.ind
of stuff aa 18 causing this visual experience". Hold some
rUbbing alcohol in front of me and tell me it's water and I
may believe it; but that doesn't make 'water' in my idiolect
refer to alcohol. But Searle really doesn't think it does;
the quoted pas8age is just a bit misleading in this respec1..
What he does think about this comes out more clearly in his
di8cussion of what he calls "the problem of particularity,"
Here, in order to avoid a problem which 1s like this
water/alcohol one only stated in terms of reference to a
particular person rather than a particular kind of stuff --
he suggests that the conditione of satisfaction in such
CAses involve in part connection to the objects of past
experiences. In an example where he seeks to bring out how
the conditione of satisfaction of Jones' thought that he's
88eing Sally require that it's Sally that he's seeing
and no~ her double, he makes this explioit. I'll avoid the
details of the discussion, but the general idea ought to be
fairly clear, as Searle at one point puts it, a "way of
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describing the situation pretheoretically might be, 11 am
now seeing the woman I have always known as Sally· ... [38J
But for present purp~8es, i~.'8 critical to see what such an
identification is acknowledged to depend ani
••• 1n order that it be part of the conditions of
satisfaction of Jones' Intentional state it must
be caused by Sally rather than twin Sally, Jones
must have 80me prior identification of Sally as
Sally, and his present experience must make
reference to that prior identification in the
determination of the causal conditions of
satisfaction. [39J
All this in hand, let' 8 COlls1der the 81 tuation of the
spectrum inversion case. Surely the general move must be
the same, as suggested earlier -- both our Earthling and
alien will have conditions of satisfaction for 'red' and the
aS80ciated experiences which will be roughly "what 1 have
always known a8 red'·. The difference comes in through the
different reference of "I", However, we're in the same
situation now with regard to "red" as we wele with the
indexicalsl What fixes what "rad" is about i8 not the
intentional content alone; a given state (even a givon
self-referential token) depends for it'. semantio properties
on the way the external world 1s -- on what happened to
caU8. it. And in this CAee, it's oven worSd. First of all,
the intuition 8eems strong that, although it was only the
reference and not the lexical meaning of the indexicals
which varied in different oontexts, the meaning of 'red'
i. different for the aliens and Earthlings, even though
their phenomenologioal characters are the same. Seoond,
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this move leaves us with a characterization of meaning which
gives us very little of what a story about meaning Bhould --
in particular, it has a fundamental difficulty with
interpersonal sameneS8 of meaning- And third, the Kind of
problem presented here and the possibility of
generalizing it suggests that .. intr111sic inner content"
doe8n't give a means for isolating brains from computers in
the way Searle wanta after all.
On the first point, I really don't have much to say,
except to suggest that any sort of non-questivn-be99in9
characterization of meanings such as by the role they
play in the explanation of behavior -- would seem to support
this suggestion. The earlier case of the two Johnnys and
"wanting a red one't 8eems to be exactly the kind of example
which 8upports this. It's worth pointing out here, though,
that itts this sort of role which separates the current case
from the standard "twin earth" case u8in~ natural kind terms
like ·water'. I for one am inclined to accept Putanam's
intuitions about 'water', in a world in which the stuff
around which looke, tastes, etc. just like water is really
not H20, 'water' not only refers to something different,
but in a certain sense of meaning, means 80mething
different as well. However, given that we explain behavior
in term. of t~e content of mental states, and the behavior
of my d02pelganger (in Putnam's case) and myself is
identical, there's at least some plausibility to the idea
that there 18 a 'kind of meaning -- "narrow OC\ltent" ,...- which
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we do share. But in the spectrum inversion case, meaning as
it figures in the explanation of behavior is varied within
the bounds of sameness of brain state. So even if (as I'm
inclined to think) some such notion of "narrow content" can
be made clear, and the problems with indexicals and
natural-kind terms can be dealt with, Searle's line still
faces the present problem.
The second point is thisl Surely one of the things an
account of meaning ought to least 8U99~st is something about
what it 18 for two people to mean the same thing by a word,
representation, or whatever. But on Searle's story, not
only do we not get this, we get the result that two people
can't mean the same thing- If what I mean by Ired'
involves direct reference to ~ and experiences,
and what you mean by 'red' involves direct reference to
you and xour experiences, then we don't mean the
same thing by 'red'. The spectrum inversion case show8 that
thinking of 8omethin9 as "looks red to me" won't give a
criterion of sameness of meaning becauee it gives the wrong
answer. To get any account of eameneS8 of meaning, then, it
looks aa though you're going to have to go outside of the
brain, and into the world at least to the level of
proximal stimuli, and maybe further.
The third point 18, for present purposes, critical.
aecall what all of this "intrinsic inner oontent" talk was
in eupport of. the view that the 8tates of brains have
their lnt.ntio~al properties (a) purely in virtue of their
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internal operation, and (b) in virtue of facts about their
internal operation other than those concerning their
1nformation~proceS8in9 structure. What we have seen so far
18 that what's in the brain doesn't determine ~he semantic
properties of our mental states as completely as Searle
would seem to suggest. Phenomenological oharacter and
biochemical structure can be held constant through
significant changes in meaning; and there isn't anything
about the brain in a vat that makes its "phenomenologically
red" thoughts mean red rather
..........
than green. But if the
meanings of intentional states can in this way be varied
even within the bounds of sameness of brain state type,
we are then left with the question we started with: What's
the relationship between Searle's purely internal CQntent
and the contents of our intentional states?
It's worth noting here that it doesn't look as though
this problem i8 limitied to the particular example used.
It's obviously the ~ of case which is of conoern --
the type in which brains have both different senso~y
apparatus and different external environments, and these
happen to mesh in such a way that the input/output relations
of the brains (and 80 their inner states) stay the same,
while at the same time the difference in how the brains are
related to the world altere what their internal states are
about. Now I'm inclined to think that this sort of
permutation -- within the bounds of sameness of brain state
of what we might CAll external oonditions of
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satisfaction can be made for many purely internally
individuated representations; however, I won't argue the
point any further here. [40J It's worth pointing out here,
though, that it's the cases where meaning seems to depend to
some extent on "internal" connections between the meanings
of representations (unlike the color case) for which this
permutation becomes less plausible -- but it's just this
internal complexity which makes more plausible the view that
it's something like inferential structure plac111g
constraints on this permutation, And the question is, given
that meaning can be permuted within the bounds of sameness
of biochemistry, why should we think that the constraints on
such permu~ation are not just those set by computational
structure?
Let me draw at least this much of a moral from all this
discussionl Whatever Searle's purely inner notion of
content comes to, it has a whole lot less to do with telling
us what given mental states~ than he would appear to
be sU9gesting- It's not that I think there isn't any way to
make sense out of the notion of what the internal
contribution to content iSl indeed, part of spelling out the
cognitivistic account of the mental depends on being able to
do something like this_ But this much seem clear. the
notions of meaning and content which are around are such
that a good deal of meaning depends on relationships to the
external environment -- at least to proximal stimuli. And
in this senes, we are like the computer in which the
--
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same program has two different interpretations on two
different days. As far as nay "internal life" or
phenomenology goes, it doesn't matter whether r'm an
Earthling or an alien; but the meanings of my words and
thoughts differ, depending on which 1 am.
v. Robots and the "Empirical" Question
Now if this is at all right, it's clear that 1n
considering whether a given machine's operation determines a
semantic interpretation for its states 1n the sort of way
our brain's operation does, we should be concerned with
whether it gets the same sort of semantic interpretation
given the same relation to the world (as much as
possible) that we have. That is, we should consider whether
a robot which is computationally equivalent to one of
us, and is such that its oomputer "brain" is hooked up to a
body so as to enable it to go about the world in much the
way you and I do, would then have representational states
which refer to the world around it the way ours do. Now
Searle in faot considers just such a case, and has the
following to say about it:
I entirely agree that in such a case we would find
it rational and indeed 1~res1stable to aocept the
hypothesis that the robot indeed had
intentionality, as long as we knew nothing more
about it .... but as soon as we knew the behavior
was the result of a formal program, and the actual
causal properties of the physical substance were
irrelevant, we would then abandon the assumption
of intentionality. [41J
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Now
absurd.
on one way of viewing what is &aid here, it's just
Of course it couldn't turn out that the actual
causal properties of the physical substance making up the
computer "brain" were totally irrelevant. The computer
couldn't cause the robot to make movements and noises at all
unless there were certain sorts of causal powers had by at
least some of its physical components; in particular, those
powers by means of which it can pUll levers, trip relays,
fire neurons, or whatever it has to do in order to get the
body to respond to its instructions. Furthermore, the
non-computational physical properties of the machine must be
in a certain sense relevant given the constrants of time and
space: computers made out of certain S~lrts of materials
just wouldn't be able to instantiate a program of anything
like the complexity which must be involved while (a) fitting
inside a medium-sized head (or body), or (b) running the
program in "real time" -- fast enough to allow the robot to
interact with the environment like we do. Even if one
allowed for radio links or some such thing so that the
computer didn't have to fit in the body, I take it it's
clear that, say, an "homunculi-head" with real human beings
for homunculi just wouldn't be able to push the symbols
around fast enough. As Fodor puts it in his response to
Searle, "it might be, in point of physical fact, that only
things that have the same simultaneous weight, density, and
shade of gray that brains have can do the things that brains
can. This would be surprising, but it's hard to see why a
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psychologist should care much." [42]
Surely Searle's intent is not then to suggest that the
physical properties of the computer might be ~ntirely
irrelevant, but rather that they might be irrelevant with
respect to the content of the computer's states; that
1s, the claim is that the physical substance might not be
the sort which oozes intentionality, 1n which case the
particular properties of the physical substance would not be
contributing any content to the computer's states. Given
Searle's line on biochemistry as the source of meaning,
something like this would seem to be the natural reading of
the above passage. However, even if we take the
"irrelevance" of the "actual causal properties of the
substance" in this way, the claim still seems to be
inherently puzzling- For there's at least some substantial
inclination to read Searle as claiming here that finding out
that the robot's behavior was "the result of a formal
program" would be itself sufficient grounds for rejecting
the assumption of mentality, and that it's not requ1red that
we somehow make an additional discovery that "the actual
causal properties of the substance were irrelevant."
Indeed, he at one point seems to put this fairly explicitly,
by claiming that "If we k.new independently how to account
for its behavior without such assumptions [i.e. of
mentality] we would not attribute intentionality to
it." [43]
But then given the assumption of our own
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intentionality, it can't turn out that our own
behavior is (or could be accounted for as) tithe result of a
formal program" which is to say, I take it, that tllere
cannot turn out to be any desoription of our brains as
automated formal systems, the instantiation of which is
causally suff:cient (given the right hOOKUp with the body
and the right dasein) for the production of the sorts of
behavior which we in fact produce. But whet then are we to
say about the behavior of our robot, which is cognitively
equivalent to me and has the right bodily hookups and
position in the world? Searle surely continues to refer to
the behavior of such a robot even after the "assumption
of intentionality" has been rejected. What sorts of
behavior does it produce, if not just the same sorts that I
do?
Searle's answer here, I take it, would be just what one
would expect in the light of the earlier discussion
regarding the distinction between in·trinsic intentional i ty
and observer-relative ascriptions of intentionality- In
another context, while discussing the behavior of performing
speech aots, Searle has the following to say:
To characterize [states] as beliefs, fears, hopes
and desires lb already to ascribe 1ntent10nality
~v tnem. ~ut speech acts have a phys1cal level at
realization, qua speech acts, that is not
intrinsically intentional. There is nothing
intrinsically intentional about the utterance act,
that is, the noises that come out of my mouth or
the marks that I make on the page. [44]
The result of carrying this sort of view across to the
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present discussion is fairly clear. (For simplicity, let me
just talk about that subclass our behavior consisting of our
utterances; surely this is the most interesting part of our
behavior when our worry is about content, and 1 tlllnk
nothing critical is lost for the particular point at hand.)
Searle is, I think, perfectly willing to allow that a robot
which is cognitively equivalent to me produces the same
utterances as I do, considered as acoustic waveforms,
movements of articulatory apparatus, strings of phonemes, or
perhaps ev~n syntactic forms. What he won't allow is
that being such a robot could be itself sufficient for the
production of the same sorts of utterances as I produce
considered as speech acts which are the expressions of
certain contents.
There's something right in this line, and it's what
Searle tries to get at in another place in claiming that
"rules affecting human behavior ••• are defined by their
content, not their form." [45] When the cognitive model is
considered as a pure1x syntactio maohine of a sort, I'm
inclined to agrree with Searle here: to give all account of
the noises wo make in terms of form (this case,
something like how they come about as a result of
syntactically characterized computational activity and
its interconnection with our artioulatory apparatus) is not
to give an account of them as meaningful bits of human
behavior. Surely this point is well taken when these noises
are accounted for in terms of the neural (or chemical, or
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which produce them. To give a
the etiology of these noises iB
contentful utterances, and then to
microphysical) structures
mentalistic account of
to consider them as
explain how an utterance with that content came to be
made; and to give such an account, it's not sufficient to
explain physically how a certain accoustic waveform came to
be made, and then simply point out that the waveform has the
same phonemic structure as do the English words "it's
raining" •
Given all this, what cognitive science must do in order
to distinguish itself from these sorts of explanations of,
say, the noises we make, is to show how it gives an account
of how, say, that speech act considered as an act of
expressing some specific content was produced. Now what
seems to be the standard story of how this might be done is
this: [46] Cognitive science is to account for the
production of behaviors individuated by content by showing
how they are the result of the sUbject's being an
instantiation of a certain sort of semantically
interereted computational/representational system. So
the account given of why, for example, Sam asserted that
it's raining will involve showing how standing in certain
sorts of computational relations to semantically interpreted
formulas e.g. his standing in the computational correlate
of belief to formulas which have the interpretations
"it's raining" and "I've just been asked what the weather is
like" and so on -- comes to cause his utterance, the meaning
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of which is that it'. raining-
Now I take it that Searle 18 not tryiny to give any
sort of a priori argument that there can be no such
cognitive diacription and theory of the way we process
information, surely this 1. the sort of question that should
be decided on the basi. of future empirical 8u~ce.8e8 and
failure. in C09nitiv8 psychology- Rather, hi. claim i8 that
the ••mantic interpretation of such representational states
muet come trom the phyaical or chemical character of the
physical realization. of any 8uch representational systems.
But note that any such account of the production of our
behavior ae the result of the working- of aome semantically
interpreted co~putational eyetem will give U8 just as good
an account of the behavior of our robot aa it will of the
bal.avior of a person. We would, by bringing 8uch an accourlt
to bear on our robot, be explaining ita actions in term. of
their content.. Of cour•• on Searle's line, we would be
giving an account of ita behavior via aome wild indulgence
in obeerver-relative ascription. of intentionality, as its
"brain" lacks the right .tuff for intrinsically intentional
repre.entations. Given thie, we can make sense out of
S.arl.'. original a •••rtion regarding the robot. If the
robot -- or on. of u. has intrineically intentional
.tat•• , it can't be the ca•• that our behavior 18 tIle rsau 1t
of a formal program in the ••n•• that it has whatever
content it do•• in virtue of being prduced by that program
(hook.d up to a body and .1tuated in the world in
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such-end-such a way). On this story, the robot's beh4vior
haa all the content it does (which 18 all observer-relative)
in virtue of theae sorte of consideration, whereas ~
behavior has content (intrinsically) in virtue of some
additional facta.
Of course the problem now 1~ that it's extremely
difficult to .8. how it 18 that, as Searle says repeatedly,
whether and entity has intrinsically intentional states or
not ia an empirical question1 e.g.;
••• perhaps, for example, Martians also have
intentionality but their brAins are made of
different stuff. That is an empirical question,
rather like the question of whether photosynthesis
can be done by something with a chemistry
different from that of chlorophyll •••. indeed it
might be possible to produce consciousness,
intentionality, and all the rest of it using some
other Borts of chemical priciples than those that
human being8 use. It i8, as I said, an empirical
question. [47J
Now aa I noted earlier, it'. of course an empirical
question aa to what other kinds of physical stuff could be
made into a computer which could instantiate the right
program at the right speed in order to interact with the
world in the way we do. For Searle, }lowever I it' 8 clear
that given a robot which i. cognitively equivalent to me,
and which interacts with it'. environment in the same way,
it'. atill an empirical que8tion whether or not that
robot hae intrinsic 1ntentlonality, and this 18 tr\1e even if
<a> entit1•• with intentionality (like us) are such that
everything relevant that we do (inoluding internal mental
The Chemistry of Intrinsic Intentionality page 45
activity) is, considered under the best account of
"observer-relative" Ascriptions of intentionality content we
might come up with, a result of our having a given sort of
cognitive structure and dase1n, and (b) such
"observer-relative" ascriptions of intentionality match up
(in our case) with whatever the right sort of ascriptions of
intrinsic intentionality are. (Notice the striking
similarity between observer-relative ascriptions of
intentionality and Ascriptions of intrinsic content.)
Anything I might say about the content of your states and
actions, I could also say about the ("observer-relative")
content of those of a cognitively equivalent robot. Surely
we meet up here with the classic bugaboo: Wnat poss11e
reason 18 there for saying in the case of the roaot that the
a8criptions don't truly ascribe intrinsic
intentionality? What p08sible empirical test could tell
us whether or not our latest creation m4naged to hay!
l'.tre-pour-eoi, or Whether God has seen fit to spit a
little drop of ectoplasm into ita head? How could we tell
unl... we could get inside its head and see what (if
anything) it'. like to 2! it?
Indeed, in his re8ponse to Dennett's commentary on the
"Minda, Brain., and Programs" piece, Searle does make the
sugge.tion (in connection with the discussion of one of his
"Chin... room" variants involving the homunculus memorizing
the rule. of the appropriate program) that an example of
this kind given by Dennett "i. underdescribed, beoause we
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are never told what 1s going on in the mind of the
agent." [48] He goe8 on to offer the following
admonishment. "Remember, in these discussions, always
insist on the first person point of view. The first step in
the operationaliat sleight of hand occurs when we try to
figure out how we would~ what it would be like for
others." [49] Now surely it's not that Searle th1nke that,
in general, if one were (or were to ask) the homunculus
in a given machine, one would know (or be told) whether or
not the flame of consciounes8 1s present and related to the
states of the entity in question in the right way to make
the representations being manipulated intrinsically
intentional ones. In the first place, this would conflict
with Searl's line on "Haugeland's demon", a speedy little
homunculus who zips around tickling neurons -- in a brain in
which the neurons have been chemically isolated from one
another -- in just the way they would have been tickled had
they not been 80 iaolated. Intentionality is produced in
this way (or 80 Searle says), but surely the demon needn't
know this. Secondly, such a criterion would seem to have
its applicability limited to single-homunculus based
machine., and given the notion of a program at hand (which
ia, recall, 8ubetantially stronger than that of simply
computing the same function), it's far from obvious that,
say, !l cognitive program could be instantiated on a
single-homunculus baaed maohine at all.
Rather, then, it would 8eem that what Searle is playing
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on here 1s the suggestion that 1n the case of s~me person
internalizing the program, the internalizing and the
(alleged) internalized mind must somehow be the same; t'taat
is, the real suggestion is that if one were the machine
itself, the embodiment of the program, then one would know
whether or not intentionality resided there. Of course, to
make Nagel's distinction (SO], the claim shouldn't be taken
as "if I were the machine ..... ' for if I were it,
there would surely be something it would be like, simply
because there's somth1ng it's like to be ~, whatever
I'm up to. Instead, the question is whether there's anything
it'. like for the machine to be it. But if this is what
Searle's empirical claim is about, I'm totally puzzled. I'm
quite inclined to think that the question of whether or not
there'. something it's like to be 80mthing does a very
good job of capturing a fundamental intuition about
consciousnes8' but I just don't see ~ny way to milk a
tltestable empirical criterion" out of it. Surely the burdell
of proof i8 on those who might wish to hold otherwise.
In any case, it's clear where to classify Searle's
worries about intrinsic 1ntenionality among the two sorts of
strategies for arguing against cognitive Bcience whioh John
Haugeland distinguishes in his article "Semantic Enginesl
An Introduction to Mind. Des1gn"l
The first, or hollow shell strategy has the
following form. no matter how well a (mere)
••mantic engine aot. aa if it understands,
etc., it can't really understand anything,
because it isn't (or hasn't got) "XU (for Borne
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"X'- ) • • • • The other, or poor 8ubst 1tute
strategy draws the line sooner. It denIes that
(mere) semantic ingines are capable even of acting
as if they understood -- semantic engine robots
are not going to get that good in the first
place. [51]
Surely Searle-. argument is paridiymatically of the
first sort; and with regard to this strategy, Haugeland goes
on to list what he sees as three leading candidates for "X",
Consciousness, primary (or intrinsic)
intentionality, and caring. 1 hope the moral of the
preceding discussion 1s clear; There may in fact be deep
and independent worries about the second candidate, but the
ones which Searle gives us seem to be purely derivative from
worries about the first. Now if we could just clear those
up ••••
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[1] Leibniz (1961), p. 206.
[2] Searle (1980).
[3] Searle (1980), p. 418.
[4] See Block (1981a).
[5] I take it that neurophysiolog!sts don't
much whether the "important" properties are
or physical in the present sense.
[6] See Block (1981b).
[7] Searle (1980), p. 422.
[8] Lycan (1980), p. 435.
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really care
functional
[9J Meaningless bit of fluff like this, and somebody tries
to make something out of it. Dreyfus (1980) distinguishes
between what he calls "08.881n1", "whioh is something like
man's actual embedding in the physical universe," and
"Dase1n2", the "bacKground of already entrenched social
practices" which are in a oertain sense
internalized against which "our activity of
taK1n9~to-refer and claimin9-to~be-true takes place." It's
Dasein2 which Dreyfus thinks is actually
"being-1n-the-world" in the Heide9gerian sen3e, and he
thinks it'. this which presents problems for cognitiv!sm.
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Sticking to the present issue, however, it's clear that it's
Caseinl that's involved at present, although Dreyfus' gloes
on this might be a little misleading. There's no prima
facie reason that all sorts of facts about our external
surroundings (including social ones) might not be
relevant parts of one's Daseinl, in the sense the they enter
into the fixation of reference for our mental states.
(10] Searle (1980), p. 452.
(11) Ibid.
[12J Ibid.
[13] This sort of example is suggested in Putnam (1981),
chapter 1. Note, however, that I'm not talking about the
sort of "full-blown" brains-in-a-vat case that Putnam is
worrying us with, in which all the sentient beings in the
universe are brains in a vat. The sorts of problems
involved in such a case are extremely interesting, but
beyond the scope of the present discussion. Rather, for the
present case it would seem that what we want is to hold our
own situation fixed (as not being brains in ~ vat) and then
consider a brain in a vat existing in our world.
[14J All the hedging here is because even this sort of
oausal "divorcing" of the brain from the rest of the world
might not be enough to guarantee that the content of its
states was somehow eure1y a result of it's biochemioal
makeup -- there still might be the possibility of some sort
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of counterfactual story about the content its states
would have had, had things been different. As I hope will
become clear later on, the issue here about counterfactuals
and how they are to be constrained is in a sense the whole
ball game.
[15] Ray (1980), p. 91.
[16J Searle (1980), pp. 451-2.
[17] Searle (1980), p. 420.
[18J Searle (1980), p. 452.
[19] Husserl (1962), pp. 228, 231.
[20] Bartre (1951), p. 38.
[21J Searle (1979a), p. 92.
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[25J Searle (1980), p. 423.
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[32] A similar case is discussed in Harman (forthcoming).
[33] This is probably overkill of a sort, as I really don't
think anybody would want to hang anything on the difference
between the brain states of a pair of doppelgangers
which was simply a result of their having learned to link up
different words with different mental states (or however
this difference should be described). Nonetheless, overkill
or not, we've now set things up so that we can get perfect
type identity of brain states in an alien / Earthling pair
as they ponder the colors of their respective roses, or of
their respective lawns.
[34J See Putnam (1981), especially chapters 1 and 2.
[35] Searle (1983), p. 207.
(36J Searle (1983), pp. 207-8.
[37J These are discussed in part 2 of this thesis.
[38J Searle (1983), p. 68.
[39J Searle (1983), p. 66.
[40J Some of the possibilities are discussed in Putnam
(1981), especially chapter 2.
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Meaning Psychologized
Part 2:
MEANING PSYCHOLOGIZED
I. Introduction
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of these problems is just thie;
cognitive significance of a
seem to determine what we normally
Now before I consider the question
The by now familiar story goes like this. if cognitive
science is to give a reconstruction of the pretheoretical
notions of the mental belief / desire psychology, the
characterization of mental states and representations in
terms of their content, and so on -- then one needs a notion
of the content of mental representations. Indeed, even if
one·s hopes for the cognitivist strategy are somewhat more
modest, it looks as though one will need such a notion in
understanding the nature of one of the constructs central to
contemporary cognitive psychology that of semantic
storage. But over the past few years, a number of
philosophers have put forward arguments purporting to show
that just such a notion is fundamentally problematic. In
what follows, I'll consider some of these philosophical
worries about the semantic properties of mental
representations, and suggest what about them, if anything,
should concern those interested in the current enterprise of
cognitive soience.
The central theme
oognitive state, or
representation, doesn't
take to be meaning.
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of meaning explicitly, let me say a bit about the notion of
cognitive state that's operative here. The central point to
bring out is that this notion should be what has been called
an "autonomous" or "solipsistic" one; that is, type identity
of cognitive state ought to be guaranteed at least by
physical type identity of sUbjects. More simply: cognitive
state ought to be a characterization of our psychological
sUbject itself, and should be 1n some sense indifferent to
what goes on outside the sUbject. The point is one found
throughout the literature, and I won't spend a lot of time
arguing for it explictly here, instead choosing to focus on
the problems involved in accepting it. But the central
theme of such arguments is clear, and Stitch's "replacement
argument" captures it as well as any: Surely our
psychological theory ought to ignore differences which not
only call • t turn up in behavior, but which can' t turn dp in
any characterization of the subject's internal structure
(and so the way in which it produces that behavior) either;
thus it ought to treat physical duplicates just the same --
i.e. physical type identity ought to entail psychological
type identity.[l]
Now given both the idea that psychology ought to be
autonomous or solipsistic, and the need to come up with a
notion of the content of psychological states or mental
respresentations, we must then specify some sort of content
which at least supervenes on physical structure of the
sUbject indeed, one might hope (given the character of
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cognitive psychology), on something far less constraining,
such as rough similarity of information processing
structure. That is, we need a notion of what gets called
narrow content. And in what follows, I'm going to
assume something like this last point -- although I don't
think it will generally make much difference. That is, I'll
assume that whatever facts about intentional stat,~s and
properties of a s\lbject supervene on that particular
physical structure would equally well supervene on anything
which had the same cognitive structure, where this is taken
to include not only a computational characterization of the
sUbject' s functional structure, but a "real t.ime"
characterization of the transducer states as well.[2] If
you think that narrow content ought to supervene on less
than this, it won't matter for the present purposes at
least it should supervene on this.
One way to view the central problems posed fOl an
accout of narrow content is to view them as stemming from
the effects of two different sorts of context on the
meaning of mental states; a natural characterization of
these would be as external and internal context.
The problem with the former (the standard "Twin Earth"
problem) takes the form of the suggestion that even if we
guarantee total physical type identity of sUbjects, changes
in the external environments of our subjects have a critioal
effect on what we would normally want to say the content of
the mental states of those subjects were, even though they
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are internally identical, their words and thoughts clearly
have different meaning., and thu8 meaning can't supervene on
the individual alone. Thus (the at.ory g08S), 1ntel1tional
peychology can't be "ind1v1dualletic".
The problem with th. latter sort of context, which 1
find much more ••rioue, 1. one which l1es in wait for those
who would find their way pa8t the f1rat problem. For once
one do.. make ••n•• of a notion of narr~w content which i.
ahared <at leaat) by doppelgangers, and which thus does not
depend in the wrong way on facta about reference for
individuation of meanings, then it 18 suggested that too
much haa been lett behind for the notl.on a.t hAnd tt) be
anything like the normal notion of meaning- The problem 18
tllat there will be no "coarae" enou9h way of individuating
the content of mental states in cas•• of subjects whose
internal etructur.. aren't exac~ly the same without appeal
to non~1n~iv1dua11.t1c facta about what the symbols and
worda refer to. Or to put it slightly differently, the
claim i. that th" only way in which 'Ie in fact are able to
dietingu1ah between meanins. and other collateral
information 1. by appeal to "non-autonomous" semantic
conaideration8. In thi. paper, ltd like to deal in turn
with each of the•• problem., offering a kind of solution to
the f1r.t, and offering 80me sort of hope for dealing with
the ••coneS -- the:.!!.! "problem of narrow content",
II. External Cont~xt and Twin-Earth
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Let me then turn to the first problem and to the
standard "Twin Earth" case. The general idea of this 80rt
of example 1. fairly clear, and 18 by now found scattered
throughout the literature. Imagine a world Which 18 just
like Earth in every respect, down to having inhabitants
which are microphysically type identical to the human
inhabitants of Earth. Now, while keeping at least SUiue uf
the inhabitants of "Twin Earth" absolute .. internal repl ieas"
of Earthlings, we imagine the external environment altered
in different small ways and consider how these alterations
affect on•• intuitions about the semantic properties of the
wor48 and thoughts of the folk from Twin Earth. In this
way, we can teet against our intuitions the degree to which
we might wish to say that "meaning 18 not in the head".
The device 1. originally Putnam's [3J, and his first
example i. the best known. We are Asked to imagine that on
Twin Earth, the stuff which fil18 lakes and res8v1ors, 18
u.ed for cSr1nk1ng and bathing, and which generall~' plays the
role which water doe. on Earth, and whicl, 18 on the whole
mor_ or 1... 1ndiat1nguiahable from water in its macro
qualiti•• (it'. clear, od.rie8s, tastele8S, and so on),
non.thel••• haa a chemical structure quite different from
that of water -~ rather than H20, it has some structure
which we can abbreviate XYZ.
-
Putnam then &SKS the
que.tiona what do•• a Twin Barther refer to by "water"? And
the an.wer which he give. 1. that he refers not to water
(Which i. , ot cour•• , H20), but rather to ~ and
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this in spite of the fact that exactly the same things go on
inside the heads of Earthlings and their doppelgangers.
Moral. psychological state (taken in the autonomOU8 sense)
doe.n't determine extension1 and thus in the sense of
"meaning" in whioh meaning determines reference, "meanings
ain't in the head."
Of cour.e there i8 a 014" ~ ,f CAses for which ita even
clearer that meaning alone does not determine reference
one for which no special 8':ience fiction stories need be
toldl the class of explicit indexicals. In "The
Meaning of Meaning", Putnam notes the similarity of the
cae.s using natural-kind terms (like "water") to these.
Worda like 'now', 'this', 'here', have long been
recognized to be indexical, or
token-reflexive i.e. to have an
extenaion which varied from context to context or
token to token. Por these words no one has ever
suggested the traditional theory that 'intension
determines extension". To take our Twin Earth
example I if I have a ~~elganger on Twin
Barth, then when I think 'I have a headache',
he thinks 'I have a headache'. But the
iiten8ion of the particular token 'I' in his
verbalized thought _ ia himaelf ••• while the
exteneion of the token 'I' in ml verbalized
thought ia me.... 80 the same word, 'I', has
two different ext.,l.ione in two different
idiolects, but it do•• not follow that the ooncept
I have of myself i. in any way different from the
ooncept my dOfpelgani8r hae of himself.
Now then, we have maintained that indexioality
extend. beyond the obviously indexical words
and morpheme. (e.g- the ten••• of verbs). Our
theory can be .ummarized a. 8aying that word. like
'water' have an unnoticed indexical component I
'water' i. stuff that bears a certain 8imilarity
relation to the water around here. Water
at another time or in another pl~or even in
another po•• ible world has to bear the relation
.ame-L to our 'water' in order to
...- ~ ...-.
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be water. Thus the theory that (1) words
hive 'intensions', which are something like
concepts associated with the words by speakers 1
and that (2) intension determines extension
cannot be true of natural-kind terms like 'water'
tor the same reason the theory cannot be true of
obviously indexical words like '1'.[4]
lnunef1iately followin9 this, Putnam mak.es a point Wllich
he 18 later in the paper to reject (albiet 80mewhat weakly),
but which certainly looKa 80 far to be exactly rightl
The theory that natural-kind terms like 'water'
are indexical leaves it open, however, whether to
8ay that 'water' in the Twin Earth dialect of
English has the same meaning as 'water' in
the Barth dialect and a different extension (which
18 what we normally say about 'I' in different
idiolects), thereby giving up the doctrine that
'meaning (intension) determines extension', or to
say, a8 we have chosen to do, that difference in
extension is irSk facto a difference inmeaning for natura ~ ind worde, thereby giving up
the doctrine that meanings are concepts, or,
indeed, m4ntal entities of any kind.[S]
Now before turning to a consideration of the reasons
one might have for rejecting the former view here, let me
digres. a bit and say what such a view might look like in a
little more detail. If we're going to 4ssimilate the
natural kind terms to the explicit 1ndexicals, we had better
have 80me sort of account of the semantics of the latter. A
plau8ible 8tart at 8uch an account has been developed by
David Kaplan, centrally in his manuscript "Demonstratives".
Let me then breifly sketch this kind of an acoount, and say
a bit about how natural-kind terms might be subsumed under
it.[6]
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III. Indexicals Content and Character
Kaplan's account 1s :In effect a "two-tiered" story
about the meaning of index1calsi he calls the two kinde of
meaning "content" and "character". The character of an
expression (indexical or not) is to be thought of as
something like what Putnam calls the concept associated with
the expression, or the cognitive significance of the
expression. Character 18 .....what is set by linguistic
conventions... it is natural to think of it 8S meaning
in the sense of what is known by the compentent language
user."[7] content, on the other hand (as Kaplan uses
the tel'm), i8 to be equated with "what was sa.id" via a
particular utterance in a particular context; it's the sort
of thing which we hold fixed when, through the use of modal
and intensional operators, we want to evaluate what someone
said with respect to some counterfactual situation.[8] It
18 this latter notion which Kaplan suggests is the one
closest to the traditional notion of a proposition; it's
content which is the Bort of meaning which determines
extenaion and truth value, and it's content which Kaplan
thinks we normally speoify in ~8crib1n9 propositional
attitude. to 8omeone. Or to put it one more way. Character
provides a function from contexts of utterance to contents,
fix the context of utterance, ~nd the oharacter of the
expr•••ion will determine it. content. Content provides a
function from circumatancee of evaluation to extensions and
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truth values, fix the circumstance 1n which a content is to
be evaluated, and it determines the extension.
Now the way in which this distinction 1s relevant to
problems with indexicals is the following: for
non-intexical terms, content and character are just the same
thing; that is, the character of such a term will determine
the same content in each context cf utterance, and its
content and its character can both be identified with its
"meaning" with no problems. Indexical expressions, however,
are "directly referential" and have "context-sensitive"
characters. To say the former is to say that the content of
the expression either is or directly specifies
the referent of the expression in the context of utterance;
to say the latter is just to say that the content of the
term varies from one context of utterance to the next -- in
particular, it varies because the referent varies, and
the referent either is or is part of the content.[9]
Let's clarify with an example, take Putnam's earlier
example of my Doppelganger and I both thinking "I've got a
headache", The concepts which we each associate with these
expressions are the same, as Putnam would have it; what we
each know by knowing the meaning of the worda is the same;
hence, the two thoughts or utterances have the same
character. They differ in content, however. 'I' is a
directly referential expression, and in ml utterance or
thought it refers to !!!!, and in his it refers to
--
And, at least in suoh a straightforward case as
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this, the different ways of viewing the distinction all seem
to fall into place quite nicely. As for content: what was
said via ml utterance, and the belief I expressed, was
that I have a headache, and what he said (and believed)
was that he has a headache; and in evaluating what we
each said with respect to some counterfactual situation,
what would matter would be whether the actual user did,
in the counterfactual situation, have a headache whether
he said anything in the counterfactual situation or not.
And aa for character, it would seem that cognitive
significance, "what we know", and "linguistic meaning" are
all invariant with respect to the two cases.
IV. The Meanings of Natural-kind terms
Keeping this means of dealing with explicit indexlcals
in mind, let's now return to the problem about the meanings
of natural-kind terms. First, it's worth briefly examining
the sort of consideration which Putnam offers in "The
Meaning of Meaning" for rejeoting the idea that we ought LO
say about these terms what we normally say about the
explicit 1ndexicals i.e., that they can~ the same
thing but have different referents on different oocasions of
use. About this option, Putnam has the following to saYI
While this is the correct route to take for an
absolutelY indexical word like 'I', it seems
incorrect for the words we have been discussing-
Consider 'elm' and 'beech', for example. If these
are 'switched' on Twin Earth, then surely we would
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not say that 'elm' has the same meaning on
Earth and Twin Earth, even if my
doppelganger's stereotype of a beech (or an
'elm', as he calls it) is identical with my
stereotype of an elm. Rather, we would say that
•elm' in m,' ~oppelganger •s idiolect means
beech. [10J
This much here is right; one natural thing to say
about such a situation is that that by 'elm' , my
doppelganger means beech. But notice that it's also
quite natural to say such things as "By 'him', she meant
George", and even "By 'that jerk', he means the guy at the
end of the bar" -- even when the supplied "gloss" (i.e.
'George', 'the guy at the end of the bar') is one which our
subject would not associate with the object of her
thought. As Putnam acknOWledges, in the case of explioit
indexicals, we ought to say that the terms in question vary
their referents but not their meaning on different occasions
of use. In cases like those just mentioned, however, it's
clear that 'means' is being used in a way which does not
accord with this point. Indeed, as the second case seems to
make especially clear (noting that 'the guy at the end of
the bar' isn't explicitly indexical), 'means' in this
context seems to be used in a way which it is interchangable
with 'refers to'. Even in the case of 'I', it seems like
the only thing wrong with saying "by 'I', he means himself"
ie that it is to say something anybody speakin9 the language
ought to know, it's oertainly true, but totally trivial.
The point of all this is just that any account of
"narrow" meaning surely shouldn't be held responsible for
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accounting for everthing of the form " X means (that) y" that
we're inclined to hold. No account can do this, because
what we're inclined to say is just plain contradictory
compare; by 'I' I mean myself and he means himself,
but the meaning of the word 'I' as I use it and as he usee
it is the same. So if we're interested in clarifying the
notion of meaning, we're either going to have to disregard
one of these ideas, or acknowledge that 'meaning' is simply
(or maybe complexly) ambiguous. In trying to develop the
notion of narrow content, one is trying to sort out this
ambiguity. Surely the history of science is full of cases
where what looked like a single notion turned out to
actually be a confusion of two (or more) distinct notions,
each of which had it's own distinct theoretical interest;
prominent examples are the cases of heat and
temperature, and of mass and weight. So, in
short, it won't do here simply to point out that we're
sometimes inclined to use 'meaning' in way way which doesn't
jibe with a notion of narrow meaning; rather, one would
need instead to show that there isn't a natural sense of
-
'meaning' which is in bccord with the idea that meaning is
"solipsistic" in the sense desired. And so in Putnam's
"beech" example, the fact that we'll say that by 'elm', the
Twin Earther means beeoh, just isn't enough; Putnam
would also need to show that there's no natural sense in
which the meaning of 'elm' for me is the same as the meaning
of 'elm' for my doppelganger, and this has yet to be
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done.[ll]
Furthermore, for cases like those at hand, it looks as
though Kaplan's content/character distinction does give
a natural notion of meaning which is shared by the
doppelgangers if we subsume these natural-kind cases under
the indexical apparatus. The content (as Kaplan uses
it) of 'elm' in our idiolects is of course different, as
reference is (at least one part of) the content of
indexicals7 however, we assign the same character to our
uses of 'elm' -- where sameness of character is guaranteed
at least by the use of all the same rules, concepts,
perceptual stereotypes, and so on. And in this sense of
meaning, surely we ~ mean the same thing by 'elm'.
v. Burge's Argument
So far I have suggested that if we view natural kind
terms as a species of indexical terms (as Putnam sU9~ests
at least in this earlier article -- we do), they can be
dealt with in the same way, and present no particular
problem for an account of narrow meaning (yet). But Tyler
Burge, particularly 1n his paper "Other Bodies", argues that
"there is no appropriate sense in whioh natural kind terms
like 'water' are indexioal", and that hence, there is no
"convenient and natural way of segregating those features of
propositional attitudes that derive from the nature of a
person's social and physioal context, on the one hand, from
those features that derive from the organism's nature, and
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palpable effects of the environment on it, on the
other."[12] It is to Burge's arguments that Illl now turn.
The central point in Burgels discussion of this matter
is that natural kind terms should not be treated in the same
way as indexicals. His reason for this is straightforward.
Accepting Putnam's gloss, Burge points out that indexicala
are (at least) terms which "have an extension which varies
from context to context or token to token". But, he
suggests, the terms under consideration don't have this
property at all:
I think it is clear that 'water', interpreted
as it is in english, or as we
EDglis~speakirs sfandardly interpret it, does not
shift extension from context to context in this
way. (One must, of course, hold the language, or
linguistic construal, fixed. Otherwise, every
word will trivially count as indexical. For by
the very conventionality of language, we can
always imagine some context in which our word
word form -- has a different extension.)[13]
Now we certainly don't want every word to count
trivially as indexical simply because the same word form
could be used in a different language with a different
reference. Consider Burge's own example of the Hart of
"shift in extension" which we surely don't want to count as
evidence for 1ndex1oality: what he says is that the analysis
of natural 'kinds as indexioal "is no more plausible than
saying that 'bachelor' is indexioal because it means
'whatever social role the speaker applies "bachelor" to'
where 'the speaker' is allowed to shift in its application
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to speakers of different linguistic communities according to
context. If Indians applied 'bachelor' to all and only male
hogs, it would not follow that 'bachelor' as it is used in
English is indexical."[14] The question to ask here,
however, is whether in order to avoid this we must "hold the
language, or linguistic contrual, fixed" in the way Burge
requires. For notice: the sort of shift in extension
possible with natural kind terms is of a significantly
different sort than that involved in Burge's 'bachelor'
concepts,
extensioncase
changing
they
the
can vary their
rules, and
without
so
on associated with the expression; i.e.
(at least on one way way understanding the earlier notion of
character) without changing their
character. Indeed, such terms can shift their
extensions even when all the facts about the organisms
internal structure (computationally or even
physically specified) are held constant
--
and it't:' just
this property which they share with explicit indexiqals.
It's an interesting fact about how we individuate
languages that difference in extension of (at least some)
terms is reason to assume two languages. But two points
should be noted here: First, the same sorts of
considerations which lead one to hope for an autonomous (or
"solipsistic") psychology might quite reasonably be taken to
point one towards the possibility of linguistics having
this same character; it's at least extremely
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counterintuitive that linguistic theory should discriminate
between physically indentical speakers in more or less
indistinguishible environments. Secondly, and more
importantly for present purposes, there is this: even if
this point about languages is accepted, this is not enough
to rule out a coherent notion of narrow meaning. In the
same way that you and I mean the same thing by 'I' (even
though by 'I', I "mean" myself and you "mean"
yourself), the two doppelgangers mean the same thing by
'water' (even though the Earther "means" H20 and the Twin
Earther "means" XYZ). The only difference is that one of
the contextual facts in the case of 'water' one might
specify context by specifying the language being spoken
which in turn, as Burge says, may in principle fix the
referents of the natural kind terms -- whereas in the case
of 'I', the context must be further specified in each case.
Perhaps what's been shown is that equating narrow content
with linguistic meaning is somewhat misleading in the case
of natural-kind terms. Rather, narrow content is a matter
of the associated concepts; and there' S (lothing in what
Burge has offered so far that shows we can't use the same
sort of apparatus as we use for indexicals in "segregating
those features of of propositional attitudes that derive
from the nature of a person's social and physical context ...
from those features which derive from the organism's
nature" •
It's worth pointing out here how these last points
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relate bacK to the earlier question from Putnam about 'elm'
in the Twin Earth language (the on which Putnam in fact
calls a "dialect of English") meaning beech, in the case
where the words are switched. One wa~' to take P\.ltnam here
is as suggesting (and indeed, something he explicitly
suggests elsewhere cf. "Meaning Holism") that it's not
just that we're inclined to say such things as "by 'elm',
they mean beech", but rather that the correct
translation of their word 'elm' into English is as
'beech' that is the way English / Twin Earth English
dictionaries should be put together. Now I think tllat to a
great degree Putnam's worries about translation are tied up
with the problems of "internal" context, and will in general
be put off until those problems are considered explicitly.
But this rouel. can be pointed out now. This suggestion about
translation surely is just another way of making Burge's
point about the individuation of languages -- fixing the
language that a given natural kind term is an expression of
will also fix the reference of that term. But to repeat,
this point about the individuation of languages itself
duesn •t seem to directly impugn the notiol'l of narro\/
content.
Let me turn brei fly to an issue which is often not
s.,parated from the coneiderc.,tion of natural kind terms as a
uind of indexical: that of the possible definability of
indexicals in general (and so, on this line, natural kind
terms) via some small class of explicit indexicals. Burge
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him••lf considers a few options for doing this (e_g_
paraphra.sing 'water' aa "stuff called ·water' around here lt )
and (rightly, I think) rejects them all. The question 18
whether this should impugn the view that I'm pushing here.
The anewer i. "no". Natural kind terms are 1ik8 indexical a
in the way I have 8u9g••ted, and J.t is this property which
••eme to me to be at the heart of indexical i ty, but nothir&9
I have .aid commits me to the view that there are only a few
"primitive" indexical. and that all the seemln91y indexical
term. are to be accounted for 48 being definable by means of
the•• "pr1mitJY•• " and the non-indexical expressions-
Returning to Kaplan'. analysis will help in clarifying
here. Aa he would have it, there 18 in a certain sense only
one primitive indexical,
-
that 18, the indexicality
of all indexical expre8sions 18 to be analyzed in term of
what he calla the 'dthat' operator. The 'dthat' operator
provide. a means for con8tructing a rigid, directly
referential, indexical expre8sion from a non-indexical
character. Thu. one might characterize the meaning of 'I'
aa 'dthat(the current speaker / thinker)', or 'nQw' as
'dthat(the pr•••nt time)', Now in the sense of Kaplan's
'Jthat' operator, I'm quite happy with the 1de4 of a single
"primitive" indexical being u••d to analyze the indexicality
of all 8uch expr•••ion., a. a piece of analytic apparatus, I
think Kaplan'. 'dthat' ha. muoh going for it. What I '1m
rejecting i. the idea that all indexicala are ~efinable in
term_ of 'dthat' and the non-indexical vocabuary -- not for
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~ny 8hortcom1n~ in the former, but for one in the latter.
Noi.1ce that in both of the above examples, the
completing character for that 'dthat' operator has
been provided by a definite description (i.e. 'the current
speaker / thinker' and ';he present time'). Now however
plausible this might be 1n the case of words like 'I' and
'now' (a position not without its own problems), surely
there i. a clear clas8 of indexical terms for which this
strategy just won't go -- those which Kaplall calla the "true
demonstrative.". As he puts ita
Some of the index1cals require, in order to
determine their references, an associated
demonstration. typically, though not invariably,
a (visual) pI ••entation of a local object
discriminated by a pointing. These indexicals are
the true demon8tratives, and 'that' is their
paradigm.... A demonstrative without an
a••ociated demonstration 18 incomplete. The
lingui8tic rule. which govern the use of the true
demonstratives ••• are not sufficient to determine
their referent in all contexts of use. Something
ele. an A880ciated demonstration -- must be
provid.d •••• Among the pure indexicals ~re 'I',
'now', 'here' (in one sense), 'tomorrow', and
others. The linguistic rule. which govern
their use fUlly determines the referent for
each oontext. No supplementary actions or
intentione are needed.n[lS)
So, on this account, true demonstratives (1) need to
have a oompleting character provided, and different
completing character. can be associated with a given
demon.tativ. on different ooca810,., and (2) the completing
character i. typically given via a visual presentation of A
local rbject. Now I take it nobody would argue with (1) if
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they're going accept any of the sort of story Kaplan tells.
And surely (2) is intuitively quite natural and plausible.
But (2) allows for at least some completing characters to be
expres.ed non-verbally_ And ae this part of the paper l18S
at l.~.t taken the 8urfoce form of a defense of certain of
Putnam'. older viewn, it'. worth noting that he ha.s (in UThe
Meaning of Mean1n~") a piece of conceptual apparatus which
i8 introduced to play 80mething like this very role of
providing a non-verbal completing character for natural kind
term.. the perceptual stereotype. Now 1 'm not cla1mir£9
that this will do the job exactly, but it 18 one of the
candidate. which merit. consideration; and it at least gives
one initially piau.' ,18 sU9gestion for what the completing
character welre interested in might be, and in what sense it
might be non~Yerbal and 80 undefinable via the non-indexical
terms.
A la8t comment on the particular question of defining
indexical.. One i~ea that has become pretty f~rmly
entrenched in the current philo8ophical literature 1s that
definition. ot our expre••• ione in term. of other
expr••• iona in our lan9uAge(a) just aren't forthcoming
and not just in the cae. of speoial cla88 of words (like the
natural kind worda), but in general. If this ia right, then
I take it that it shouldn't be 8urprieing that, even 9iven
80me means of "i.olating" the .ndexical component of a
natural kind term from the non-indexical part of it's
charaoter, that no ehort-and..ea8y parphra••• of the "narrow"
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meaning of the expression in terms of other expressions 1n
the language are forthcoming-
Let me then tie up this part of the discussion by
swmmariaing along with Burge. As he puts it;
To summarize our viewl The differences between
Earth and Twin-Earth will affect the attributions
of propo.itional attiudea to inhabitants of the
two planet..... The differences are not to be
AS8imilated to differences in the extensions of
indexical expressions with the same constant,
linguistic meaning. For the relevant terms are
not indexical. The differences, rather, involve
the constant context-free interpretation of the
terms. Propositional attitude ascriptions which
put the terms in oblique occurance will thus
affect the content of the propositional attitudes.
Since mental acta and states are individuated
(partly) in terms of their contents, the
difference. between Barth and Twin-Earth include
differences in the mental acta and states of their
inhabitants. [16]
To similarly summarize my evalutiona I'm willing to
buy the first claim above -- the differences involved here
affect our normal ascriptions of propositional attitudes;
e.g., Adam of Earth believee that water i8 wet, but his
doppelganger doe.n't. However, I do think such oases
should be a.similated to those of index1cals, such as the
situation where Adam of Earth believee that my mother 1s
nice, and hi. doppelganger doesn't. Burge's reason for
rejecting this 1. that such differences, unlike those
involving explicit indexioal., involve the "constant
context-free interpretation of the terms." But Burge's
"context-tree" evaluation depends on fixing the
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language, the suggestion being that 1f we don't do this,
every term is "trivially index1c",,1". But I've suggested
that the mark of index!cality" we should be interested in
in the present context 18 the potential for shifts in
reference where we hold fixed the character of the
expressions or thoughts something which ought to be
guaranteed at least by fixing the (autonomously specified)
cognitive (or even physical) characterization of the
sUbject. Fixing this gives a natural alternative to fixing
the langug8 (in this slightly pregnant sense), and avoids
such caees as Burge's "bachelor / male hog" case.[17]
I think the thing to say at this point is that we've
not seen anything in the discussion so far which should
force us to reject the antecedently very plausible idea that
in at least one sense of meaning, sameness ~f the organism
entails 8ameness in meaning- The cases involving natural
kind terms can be 4s81n\.1.1ated to hose involving
explicit indexical., where what we hold fixed is cognitive
structure rather than "wide" meaning- But this has a
••rioue problem in that it doesn't seem to give us a
coar.. enough cut. That i8, even if there is a fairly
clear ••n88 in which doppelsanier8 mean the same thing
by natural kind terms in spite of differences in referenoe
cau••d by differing physical environments, it also ought to
turn out on anx natural account of meaning
that .mall differenc•• in cognitive structure are compatible
with .amen••• of (narrow) meaning, e.g., you and I are
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hardly doppelgangers, but surely whatever meaning comes to,
it ought to turn out that we mean the same thing by "chair".
Exact cognitive identity is fine as a sufficient condition
for sameness of narrow content, but it obviously won't do as
even the roughest approximation of a neccesary one. We
would like, then, to say what sort of autonomous or
s011psistic sorts of considerations might play this ~olel
and the moral of Putnam and Burge's points has been that a
couple of natural candidates here -- sameness of reference
and sameness of lang8uge (at least in the sense
discus8ed) just aren't autonomous facts about the
organism. But this problem of gl08sing over "unimportant"
differences in cognitive structure is jUdt what I earlier
called the problem of the effect of internal context on
meaning-
Before turning to an explicit examination of this
problem, let me comment breifly about the sorts of remarks
Burge (and Putnam, in some of his moods) makes about the
effects social rather than physical context have on
(wide, of course) meaning. The st1111dard vera ion of this is
Burge's "arthritis" case. We imagine a pair of
doppelgangers whoee external environment differs simply in
the way the word (or word form) 'arthritis' is used by
certain other members of their societies. In the situation
of the doppelganger here on Earth, speaking English, other
people in the 80ciety physicians, more educated lay
people know that arthriti. i. a disease of the joints
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only, and hence that one cannot have arthritis in, say, the
thigh. In the alien doppelganger's society, however, the
physicians and educated lay people use 'arthritis' to refer
to a slightly different class of afflictions; and according
to their "concept of arthritis", there's nothing
particularly unusual auout having what they call. 'arthritis'
in the thigh as well as in the joints, Our present
sUbjects, however, don't have any very well defined opinion
about the possibility of having what they each refer to as
'arthritis' in areas other than the joints, but nothing in
their ., internalized II concept rules it out.
The case so set up, the sort of points Burge makes are
much the same as those made about the effects of different
physical contexts I The Earther "means" arthritis, the
alien doesn't, this difference isn't to be accounted for in
the way indexicals are; and so on. Now I think the general
strategy for dealing with this is no different than the one
taken above with the 'water' case. But this kind of case
has an extra element thrown in it makes use of the
a8sumption that our ubject8 mean the same thing by their
uses of 'arthritis' as do the physicians in their respective
societies. And if "means" 18 taken in the wide sense
-
(where "meaning" for natural ..kind terms is "99% reference"),
this 8eeme fine. The question is whether when clarifying
the notion of narrow content we either can or must make
th1. a ••umption ~- which once again bring8 U8 to the topic
of "internal" context, and it'. to this I'll now turn.
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Probably the most conspicuous version of this problem
is posed by Putnam in his paper "Computational Psychology
and Interp~etation Theory"; I'll begin with a consideration
of it. As for the question which Putnam sees hiInse 1 f as
posing, "the problem is this: if the brain's semantics for
its medium of representation is verificationist [or for our
purposes, solipsistic] and not truth-conditional, then what
happens to the notion of the "content" of a
representation?"[18]
mental
Something awful, we're assured; and that assurance
comes primarily through the use of the following example of
the two Ruritanian children.
Imagine that there is a country somewhere on
Earth called Ruritania. In the country let us
imagine that there are small differences between
the dialects which are spoken in the north and in
the south. One of these differences is that the
word "grug" means silver in the northern dialAr;t
and aluminum in the southern dialect. Imagine two
children, Oscar and Elmer, who grow up in
Ruritania. They are as alike in genetic
construction and environment as you please, except
that Oscar grows up in the south of Rur1tania and
Elmer grows up in the north of Ruritania. Imagine
Ahat in the north of Ruritania, for some reason,
POt8 and pans are normally made of silver, whereas
in the south of Rur1tan1a pots and pans are
normally made of aluminum. So northern children
grow up knowing that pote and pans are normally
made of "grug", and southern children grow up
knowing that pot. an4 pans are normally made of
"grug".(19]
The fir8t point that Putnam takes from the description
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of this case is one which it would seem there' s no denyirlg:
Take any account of "narrow" or "solipsistic" meaning -- any
account of content such that difference in extension does
not enter directly into determination of meanings; "on any
such notion of content it would seem that "grug" in Oscar's
mind would have the same content as "grug" in Elmer's mind.
Not only would the words have th~ same content; any mental
signs or predicate-analogues that the brain might use in its
computation and that corresponded to the verbal item "grug"
would have the same content at this stage."[20] The
following question is then asked:
But if the word "grug" , and the mental
representations that stand behind the word
..grug ..... have the same content at this stage,
then ~ 22 they come to
differ in content? By the tIme oscar
and Elmer~ave become adults, have learned foreign
languages, and so on, they certainly will not have
the same conception of grug •••• Each of them will
know many facts which serve to distinguish silver
from aluminum, and "grug" in the South Ruritanian
sense from "grug" in the North Ruritanian
88n88.[21]
So, sinoe Oscar and Elmer have different "concept.s of grug"
as adults, but the same one as ohildren, they must have
changed their concept of grug along the way. But the sorts
of things Oscar and Elmer learned along the way seem like
jU8t the sorts of things we would normally characterize as
learning more about grug, or forming more beliefs in whioh
their concept of grug figures. As Putnam puts it,
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••• there is no stage at which the word Ugrug " or
the corresponding mental rapresentation in the
mind of Oscar •.• is ever treated as changing its
reference. internally to treat a sign as
changing its reference is to treat it as, in
effect, a different sign, This never happens; in
the internal point of view all that happens is
that Oucar acquires more information about
grug.... When the use of a word is modified by
the continual acquisition of collateral
information, without it being 8u~posed that at any
stage the word is being committed to a new
extension, all that happens (in the
verificationist model) is that the degree of
confirmation of various sentences containing the
word changes.[22]
Now the immediate conclusion that Putnam draws from
this all this is a fairly mild one, and one which I'm at
least initially quite inclined to accept it • s silnply that
"we can have a complete description of the use of mental
signs without thereby having a criterion which distinguishes
changes 1n content of mental signs from changes in
collateral information."[23] But he doesn't stop there;
rather, two pages later, after quickly considering a couple
of possiblt::' ways of providing su(~h a criterion, he states
wh~t I take to be the real point of his discussioOI
vnce we decide to put the reference (or rather the
difference in reference) aside, and to aSK whether
"grug" has the same "content" in the minds of
Oscar and Elmer, we have embarked on an impossible
taSK. Far from making it easier for ourselves to
decide whether representations are synonymous, we
have made it impossible.... "Factoring out"
differences in extension will only make a
principled distinction on when there has been a
change in meaning totally impo8sible.[23]
The problem 1& then thisl narrow content must factor
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out consideration of the sorts of differences in extension
which show up in cases like the "twin earth" and "Ruritania U
ones. But it's extension which is the central guide in
determining when changes in meaning rather than shifts in
collateral information occur. Thus, with regard to narrow
content, a "principled distinction" between change of
meaning and change in collateral information cannot be
made. How, Putnam is asking, can we draw the line in a
principled way between the meaning of "grug" for Oscar the
child and Oscar the adult?
For what's to follow, let me put the point slightly
differently. Let's call the totality of a representation's
inferential relationships to other representations in a
particular system it's conceptual role (following
Field [25]). So, the conceptual role of 'water' for me now
will depend on all the inferences I'm inclined to make about
water, even on the basis of facts about water which are,
intuitively, collateral information about water rather that
facts constituitive of it's meaning- For example, I believe
that there's lots of dirty water in the Charles; given that,
someone who held all the other attitudes toward water
that I do but failed to believe that there's lota of dirty
water in the Charles would have a different oonceptual role
for 'water' than I do. We might then put Putnam's question
like this: Which changes in conceptual role count as
changes in meaning? Or, assuming that a representation's
having some particular meaning is just a matter of ltd
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having some particular kind of conceptual role
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What
conceptual roles for a representation ~ake it mean what it
does rather than something else?
VII. Fodor's Response
What I '11 do 11.0W is turn to a consideration OJ: the sort
of response made to this question by Jerry Fodor (pretty
clearly a central target of Putnam's here) in some of his
recent work. One place where Fodor's current view is
expounded is in his paper "Narrow Content and Meaning
Holism"; and here, in response the the sort of problem
Putnam offers, Fodor has the following to say:
To summarize: once you have functional role
semantics you have semantic holism (and hence
skepticism about the contents of propositional
attitudes.)[26] ••• it is notable that neither
Ouine, nor Putnam, nor to my knowledge --
anybody else, has provided serious arguments for
the identification of meaning (/conceptual
content) with functional roLe. I suspect that the
main argument is simply a presumed la~k of
plausible alternatives. This suggests a tactic
for dealing with semantic holism: namely, don't
grant the theory of m~anin~ that it
presupposes. [27]
So, following this line, what we're in want of is a
plausible alternative to the identification of meanings with
conceptual roles; and (surprise!) Fodor has a candidate
ready and waiting -- what he calls "denotational semantics",
Although this view is mentioned breifly in the "Nat'row
Content and Meaning Holism" paper, it is in his paper
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"Psychosemantics; or, Where do Truth Conditions Come From?"
that this view is most fully spelled out. I would like to
avoid getting into the details of the view here -- and more
importantly, I think that I can while making the point I
want here. So let me try to give Fodor ' 3 punoh line without
telling the whole joke.
On this story, what allows representations with
different conceptual roles to mean the same thing is that,
in spite of the possible differences in the causal chains
leading to their okening, they are nonetheless both
appropriately connected to the right property in the world;
..... if Blind Me can share my concept of water, that's not
because we both have mental representations with abstractly
identical causal roles; rather, it's because we both have
mental representations that are a~propriately connected
(causally, say) to water."[28]
Now one kind of pI'oblem which Fodor admits this sort uf
view faoes is what he calls the "thinness of slice"
problem. This is, of course, just a resurfacing of the
sorts of considerations that made us want a notion of
narrow content rather than truth oonditional oontent for
the purposes of pychological explanation. As Fodor says,
••• it's important to have a semantio theory that
slices mental states thin enough, a theory which
allows us to distinguish beliefs about The Morning
Star from beliefs about The Evening Star, beliefs
about closed trian9ular~ from beliefs about olosed
trilaterals, and so forth. Now, since The Morning
Star is the Evening Star (since all closed
trianguIars are olosed trilaterals and vice
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versa), it is surely plausible that no purely
denotational theory of ~ontent can slice mental
states thin enough.[29]
Of course, something 1 ike conceptual role seUlalltics is
ideal for this task -- the critical dIfference in the role
of 'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star' beliefs in the
causation of behavior is surely a matter of the diffeent
inferences one is inclined to make from such beliefs.
Conceptual role semantics may have a hard time cutting
slices thick enough, but thin slices al"e what it' s ma,ie
for. How do we get thin slices without recourse to
conceptual role?
Easy: "The way t<"' slice mental contents thin enough i.a
by postulating thin propert 1 3s."[30] So, suppose we want it
to COIRe out that 'closed triangld' and 'closed trilateral'
have different meanings; then "one could simply take the
view that the property of being a closed triangle is
different from the property of being a closed trilateral."
[31J But as Fodor aCKnowledges, this neems, at least in
~ome cases, to be a bit much. To tak.e an almost
contemptuously f;..mili.ar example: the property of being
water and the properti of being H20 looK, at least on the
face of it, to be the very same property. So (as Fodor
reasonably asks himself), "how are you going to 'keep the
thought that wate~ is wet distinct from the thought ~hat ' 20
is?" [32J
Fodor's answer 1s essentially the same as that given by
Fred Dretske in his book knowledge tIle
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flow
-
of information. Dretske's own
tld.notational" view on semantics 1. similar to Fodor's in
many respects (or vice-versa, if you prefer), and
particurftrly in the central idea that it 18 connection with
the properties of the wOl~d rather than conceptual role
which i. central to meaning- Aa for the present problem,
th~ugh, the line ia thiaa Roughly, concepts play the
role of "narrow contents " for Dretake, and 80 to separate
coextensive concepta, he .imply claims that
the only wsy a Bystem can ha~e Jistinct concepts F
and G, when the.e concepts are equivalent in one
of the described ~ay. [i.e. analytically or
nomologically coextensive], 18 it at least one of
them i. complex, if one of the ~. built u~ out of
conceptual elemente tllat the other is not •...
What i. 18 impo8.ible on the present account of
thing_ 1. to have two primitive concepts that
are equivalent. [3~]
Similarly, we have Fodor's way of putting the move.
I ttink th~ way to fix the fatness of slice
pr~blem ie to let in a moderate, re8tricted and
well behaved amount of fun~tional ro13. The point
about the expre88lone 'water' va. 'H20' i8 that,
though they pr••utnably denote the same
property, the second i. a complex formula built
out of expreraion8 whl~h themeevee denote
hydrogen and oxygen. I do want lj let into
••mantic. -- over and above denotation those
implication. which accrue t" lin eXpre881.0n in
virtue of the relatione to Ruch other expression
ae occur a.. ita Byl.tactio canst! tuent8 •[34 J
Thi. may ••rve for cutting apart 'the morning star'
from 'the .ven1ng .tar', and '~ater' from 'H20', trou~le is,
it a1ao look. to ••parate 'b"','helor' from 'unmarried man' as
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well. Surely 'unmaried mAn' is, like 'H20', A "complex
formula" built out of expressions which denote the distinct
properties of being unmarried and being a man. ~ld it
certainly s.ems, at least prima facie, that it would be nice
1~ ·bac~.eor' and 'unmarried man' turned out to mean the
aame thing on our ••mantic theory.
So it looks ae though even the IImoderate, restricted,
and well behaved" bit of conceptual role allowed in here
eneSs up slicing th1nqa up too thinly. Bllt there' 8 Ii further
problem with the account at hand which is, I think, mucll
deeper, but was glo••ed over in the preceeding discussion.
There, we simply •••umed the "obvious" candidate for the
denoted property. What remains to be 1,8en i8 whether, aside
from the problema just noted, we can get a reasonable
characterization of this denotation relation at all. So let
me now turn to Fodor'. characterization of this, which 18 to
be found primarily in hi. paper "Psychosemantic8, or, Where
Do Truth"conditlona Come From?" The p"81t1on given l\ore is
complex and thought-provoking, and has innumerably many
lnter••ting con••quenc•• and potential problel8 whioh I'm
afraid I'll juet have to sKirt here. What I'm inter••ted in
tor pr••ent purpo... 1. how the line in que.tion might
facilitate an avoidance of the meaning holiam problema, and
it'. to that particular que6Llon that I'll try lo confind
thi. cSi.cu••ion.
VIII. Evolution and Denotation
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To start with, then, Fodor tells us that "the ~nly
symbol to
-
world relat.ons that affect the
aemanticity of mental representation Are the ones they bear
to 8tates of affairs that determine their truth
value."[3S) ~- i.e., the only relations to the world that
matter are truth conditiona, But "what make. [etate of
affairs] S the truth condition for [mental representation]
M••• ia that S i. the entry condition for
and "the entry condition for a mental representation M is
that .tate of affairs 8uch that. under ~ond1tione of normal
functioning (the organism' 8 cogni ti ve system pUls M in ':he
ye.-box iff the state of affairs obtaina.)"[37]
Now the first thing to point out 18 how nuch is r1din
on the "conditions of normal functioning" clause here. As
Fodor readiliy pointe out, the entry condition for M i8
not juat th~ condition(a) that is (/are) causally
nec•••arary and sufficient for M's being put in the
y.e-box. Intuitively, there would ••em to be two kinds of
cau •• where the conditions re.pon8ible for M'. being tokened
are not MI. truth/entry conditionM, and which thereby n~ed
to be ruled out by the "normal functioning" proviao.
The f1rat kind ot ca.. at lea8t looka reasonably
.tra1ghtforward. Surely we wou14 like to rule out
condition. of token1ng which involve 8uch thing. 48 the
intervention of neuroaurgeon., hallucinogenic drug8, or
.hot. to the head. In ahort, we at least want to require
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80mething like no breakdowns of the machinery. We're
pretending that there 18 a computational story to tell about
how we go from aomething like stimulations to puttlr19
repre.entations in the yes-box. Certanly any reasonable
story about "normal conditions" here will require thbt under
normal conaition., MI. getting into the yes-box will be a
r ••ul t of the "internally correct II wor)t1ng8 of the cogni ti va
mechanism.; that is, itt. in thare because the computational
syatem put it there, and the system isn't in any WAy
internally malfunctioning- And it'. just this 80rt of
constraint which can keep entry conditions from ~ncludin9
such things ae the actions of brain-writing neuro8urg8ona.
How it may not being entirely obvious how to
characterize this "no break4owna" .tate, but it looks pretty
straightforward compared to the other kind of case that
"normal functioning" ie supposed to rule out.[38] Fo~ Fodor
clear ly (and wi th good reason) Wa~\t8 it to rule out cAses
where the interna mechanisms would not aeem to be
malfunctioning, but misrepre.entation occur. because the
external .1tuat1on 1. not "normal" in the relevant 8er188.
Probably the clear•• t (but alae moat tarfetched) example of
m18repr•••ntation of th1. kind wou14 be the .t~ndard sort of
"brain-1n-a-vat" ca... take my brain out of my body but
k••p nouwi8hi.ng and at1mulat1ng it in the right way, and (as
the fable go•• ) you'll be able to satiety the uno internal
malfunction" rtlad1ng of normal oondition.... But by doing
that, you .till bring about a a1tuation where I'm
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miarepresenting things- It 8eems to me and I
wholehartedly helieve -- that I'm sitting at my desk typing,
but I'm We have set up conditions which are
causally sufficient for my believing that I'm typing, and in
which no internal malfunctions of the cognitive mechanisms
have occurred, but because the conditions aren't "normal" in
the relevant .ene., we have what Fodor calls a "wild
tokening" of the belief that I'm typing-
The qu••tion we're then faced with 18 this& where do
we get a notion of "normal c1rcumatance u which will do the
job needed here? Or as Fodor puts it, ..... if we've ~lready
u.ed up all that [i.e. causally necessary and sufficient
conditions] to establish representation, what more could be
required to ••tabli8h truth?"[39]
An8werl ~.1.ol09Y.
The distinction between normal and wild tokens
re.te .0 far at leaat ~ on d pretty etrong
notion of teleology. It's only in the
teleological ca... that we have any way ofjuetifying the claim that wild tokens represent
the .am. thing that etiologically normal on~8 dOl
and it la, aa we've ••en, that claim on which the
pr•••nt .tory about misrepresentation
r ••ta.[40]
And how exactly 1. teleology auppoadd to 8upport this
di.t1~ctlon? The central 1de. 1. that "'abnornal etiology'
[i ••. violation ,t the "normal conditione" proviso] will
have to be defined with r ••pect to the tel.olo9~' of the
belief-fixing (1... cognitive) m.chan1.m.... [41] Defined
how? Well, 'I. normally funotlonlng 00901 ti ve ayatem 18 one
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that ie doing whatever it 18 that cognitive systems were
designed to do."[42] Or as it's put at one pointl
••••ntry condtiona are defined in terms of the
teleology of cognitive systems (they are, for
example, the conditions that 8uch systems respect
when they're oing what tRey were
.elected to do.) --xnd t e prImary
function of cognitive-systems is, surely, to bring
about coherent relatione between the propositional
attitude. of an organism and the
.tat.. of it. environmen~ So,
for example;- hhY does a light go on in a
frog'. head w en a conapecific croaks? Well,
becau•• there are (cognitive) mechanisms which
throw the switch just in ca•• a certain array of
acou8tic energy impinge. upon the frog's auditory
transducers. But why are there these mechanisms?
In virtue of what do they have their selection
advantage? in virtue of their
ability to-- correlate certaIn
mental bEat.. of the frog
with ~ pr••ince -of !
croaking cons,_ciliC. So, then, --what is
It for the c090 tlve system of the frog to be
functioning normally in this respect? it's
for the frog'. yea-box to contain a "herro,
there'. a croaking conepecif1o' token 1ff there's
a croaking conepecific on the 8cene.[43]
Now in the ca•• of the frog, it l • certainly quite
plauelble that ita cognitive mechanisms were
(1.e •••lected) for their ability (in part) to put Ithere'e
a croaking conepecific around' in the ye.-box iff there-. a
croaking conapecif1c aroun4. Furthermoro, lim inclined to
think it'. quite plau.1ble that ~~ cognitive meohanisms
(or a le.8t 80m. 8ub.yatem ot them) were .elected (in pArt)
for their ability to, e.g., provide U8 with repre3entation
ot th••hap. ot the me41um-aize4 physical object around us.
Surely thi. 1. the kind of "teleology of the visual system"
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that people studying the workings of the visual system talk
about. The question to Ask, however, is whether there's any
sense in which it's plausible that our cognitive systems
were selected for, say, their ability to put
'there's an airplane' in the yea-box when we're confronted
with an airplane.
(Before trying to answer this, it's worth pointing out
that even if the answer 1s yea, it may not give us what we
want. We wanted from the start a notion of content which
was the 8ame for physically identical organisms. But even
if this move works, what Wd get i8 a notion of content for
organisms which have cognitive systems which are designed
for the same purpose., and ~hY8ical type identity doesn't
guarantee this in principle. It'. of cour8e possible in
principle to have a dU~licat~ of me materialize from the
random motions of molecules; ani kind of teleological
approach to content would then have such a duplicate's
stat•• have different (narrow) contents than mine.)
Of cour.. the initial point to make here 1s fairly
obv1oua, What make. (e_g_) "that'. a chair" or "that's an
airplane" have the truth conditione that they do can't
be that chair. or airplane. were caueally efficatiou8 in the
right way in the evolutionory history of the or9an~8m
(natural hi.tory being what it ia and all.) Our oogn1tve
mechaniam. were not .elected for their ability to signal the
partioular propert1.. of being a ohair or being an
airplane. ~ut then how can evolution give U8 a grip on
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"normal circumstances" for putting "that's an airplane" or
"that' 8 a chair" in the yes-box?
Fodor's response to this sort of obje~tionl
••• once selection has shaped a cognitive (or any
other) mechanism, there are indefinitely many
counterfactua18 that will be true in virtue of the
structure of that mechanism. Suppose that
selection pressures favor organisms that con add.
Then, inter alia, they favor organisms that can
add 27 and 54. That can be true even though no
organism ever did add 27 and 54, 80 that ~ase8 of
doing that sum played no role in the etiology of
any psychological menhanism. It i8 a serious
misunderstanding 'of evolutionary theory to suppose
that the explanation of a capacity by reference to
.electional advantage presuppo5es that thatjery capacitl has sometimes ~een exercised
n the evolutton~ry history of the organ1sm.[44]
So then, we should ask, what 18 this general capacity
which (like adding in the above example) has been selected
for, and of which our abilitld. with regard to airplanes and
chair are (like adding 27 dnd 54) special cases whi:h never
in fact happen to ariee in the .election process? Aa noted
earlier, it'. Fodor'. view that "the primary function of
cognitive .yat.me 1., 8urely, to bring about coherent
relatione between the propositional attitud8B of an organism
and
-
And
the
-
what
.tat••
coherent
of
-
relAtion is
ita
that?
environment."
Knowing the
truth.
-.-.
.,.our belief / d•• ire paychology involves U8 in a
teleological a ••umpt1on about the cognitive
meohaniem., namely that they're designed to fix
Whatever beliefa are true. It i8, I claim, only
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on this Assumption that we can make sense of the
semanticity of propositional attiudes.[45]
So the "normal functioning" of our cognitive mechanisms
appealed to in the specification of entry (and hence truth)
conditione is defined 1n terms of those meohanisms doing
what they were seleoted to dOl and what they were selected
for was generating a perfect corrd'pondence between states
of affairs in the world and sentences in the yes-box
i.e., for believing what's true. Of course, as Fodor
acknowledges, we can in fact be fooled (e-g- by holograms)
or be ignorant (e-g- because we're too far away too see).
But theRe are, 8 he says, accidents; and "the most
u8ual of these 'accidents' is, of course, the ailure of
epistemic appropriateness ond1tiona in virtue of acts
about the causal/spatia-temporal s1tuat1ol1 of the
organism. ("I couldn't see it from here, ...... ) .. [46] Or,
putting it differently. "rub our noses in the faot hat
and (if we can frame the thought that we'll com to
believe that P. But, of course, for indefinitely many
state. of affair•••• our noses are never so
rubbed ...... [47J
Once again I'm going to skirt some important and
inter•• ting ia.ues that ari8e here, particularly (1) the
potentJal for circularity here, and thu8 the failure to give
a naturaliatic account of the semantics of mental
repre.entations (a charge which Fodor trie8 to answer), and
(2) the conneotions of this position with verificat1onism.
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The issue at hand is the use of this move to avoid tIle
meaning holism problem fr conceptual role semantics; let me
then confine the points here to what I see as the failure of
this particular move.
First, then, let's consider the "selection for
addition" example offered; or for a first try, selection for
the ability to count. It's at least plausible that the
ability to count could have selection advantages (e-g. it's
helpful in making sure you haven't lost one of the kids).
But all of the particular counting tasks which might turn
out to be efficatiou8 in the selection process will have
some upper bound -- for example, if counting is important
because it allows the organism to keep track of the kids,
then there won' t be any selection'll advantage ill being able
to count higher than the number of offspring had at any
given time. This doesn't mean that the general ability to
count couldn't have been selected fo~, though. It may have
been that ~- because of the prior structure of the organism,
or even becauso of general facta about the biological
underpinning8 of cognitive mechanisms (les8 plausible) --
the kind of mechanism that was avialable to solvo the "count
to 10" task WAS in fact
-
a general cour,ting
mechanism. The point i8, however, that the sorts of facts
in this kind of case which determine whether you get a
9~neral counter or a lO-notch tally board aren't facts about
.election pre.sures, they're instead facts about how the
species' prior struoture and biological underpinnings allow
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it to respoad to the selection pressures.
So selection pressures favoring organisms that can
count does not mean they must, inter alia, favor orgarisms
which can count to 100. And similarly for adding: if the
ability to add 27 and 54 never played a role in evolutionary
history, then there are no external selection pressures
which favor organisms which can add over those which can add
everything except 27 and 54. Of course in this case, there
some inclination to think (although it's hard to say exactly
why) that the internal constraints of the machinery would
favor the adder over the shmadder in contrast to the
counting case, where if anything, the inclination seems to
run the other way. But my intuitions about that aren't
particularly important for present pur~oses. What is
important is the general point: For any general capacity
(like adding or counting) there will be some nite (and
sometimes, as in the countng example, small) set of uses of
that capacity which will, as a matter of natural history,
actually be evolutionarily effioatious. And external
selection pressures don't bear at all on what mechanism
meets those uses or how it behaves in cases (like adding 27
and 54) which never came up. Just as data underdetermines
theory, external selection pressures underdetermine
cognitive mechanism.
Back to ~ruth. Now it's ok with me if there a~e
80me repre8entati~ns and states of affairs for wh~ch this
whole story turns out to be right. In fact, suoh
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representations as those which describe the shape of
medium-sized physical objects in our vicinity or which
describe something as a human face look like reasonable
candidates. There's at least aome plausibility that there
were direct external selection pressures which favored
organisms which ere as close to omniscient as possible
about the applica1.1on of such descriptions. Let me call
such representations (if indeed there are any such)the
teleologically salient ones. ';.he question is then
of course whether there's any reason to think that given
no direct selection pressures favoring the ability to
accurately apply "chair", "airplane", or even "arthritis"
cognitive mechanisms were selected for the ability to
fix just those beliefs that are ~, rather
than for the ability to fix just those true beliefs
representable in the vocabulary of
-
consisting of just the teleologically
salient representations. The answer to that
question, as far as I oan see, is no. But if that's
right, then it would seem that there's no teleologically
grounded notion of "normal circumstances ., for the
representations which are not teleologically salient, and
hence no teleologioal story to tell about their entry/truth
conditions,
But there's atill an option for this line. Reoall that
"the entry condition for a mental representation M is that
state of affairs such that I under oonditions of normal
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functioning (the organism's cognitive system puts M in the
yes-box iff the state of affairs obtains.)" Perhaps then,
although there 1s no teleologically grounded notion of
"normal functioning" for representations like "that's a
chair", we can just specify normal furlctioning of the
cognitive machinery in general as "normal functioning (i.e.
almost omniscience) for all the b~liefs statable in the
vocabulary of teleologically salient representations."
Then, we could just say that "is a chair" has the property
of being a chair as it's entry ~onditions just in case it's
tokening is perfec~~ly correlated with the property in
circumstances which are the idealized "teleologically
normal" ones i.e. the ones in which we have "almost
omniscience" for the class of beliefs delimited above.
Indeed, this may be what Fodor has in mind when he states
his point by say that "representations generated in
teleologically normal circumstances must be true."[48]
However, as I'll try to point out now, the qualifications on
this forced by what I've said so far seriously impugn the
value of this line in avoiding the meaning holism problems.
Consider; First of all, recall the qualifioation
about in addition to having "norMally functioning"
cognitive mechanisms having to rub our noses in the
entry conditions of a representation in order to made us
"almost omniscient" about it. As it's put at one point,
In sh.-·.:-t, there are
co~dition8 that need to
anyhow three
be attended
sorts of
to in
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accounting for why a given mental symbol does (or
doe.n't) turn up in the yes-box I whether the
entry condition of the symbol is satisfied,
whether the cognitive apparatus of the organism is
functioning normally in respect of the entry
condition; and whether the organism is
appropriately situated i8 respect of the state of
affaire that satisfies the entry condition •...
The omniscience claim is in force only when all
three aorta of constraints are simutaneously
aati8f1ed.[49]
Now in the ca8e of the teleologically salient
representationa, it aeeme at least plausible tllat rubbing
our nos.. in the entry conditions might simply amount to
something like our giving it a good inspection in favorable
perceptual conditions (good light, etc.). One plausible way
to view it (which Fodor would however reject) might be in
terms of getting all the pos8ible epistemic access to the
entry conditions that could have been had in the
evolutionary environment roughlyz no microscopes, but
you can look and touch all you like. The question to ask,
however, 1. what 8uch a nose-rubbing might amount to in the
caee of such non-teleologioally salient properties as
arthritis. In particular, would such a nose-rubbing
include rubbing one'8 nose in 80cial and linguistic
facta or not?
If .0, then it looks ae though the gAme has been given
up to Putnam and Burge. If (a) the content of the
repre.entation 'arthritis' depends on what it denotes,
and (b) what it denotes 18 a matter of what I'd take it to
denote given all
-
the relevant evidence (including
8uch thing. ae finding out how the experts use the term and,
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say, discovering that Putnam's thesis of the linguistic
division of labor is true), then the content of my mental
representation 'arthritis' is only determined against that
background of Bocial and linguistic facts. A doppelganger
of mine in a society where the experts used the term
differently, or where other 80cial or linguistic facts
affecting the reference of the term were different, would
not have the same content for his representation. Or to
return to Putnan's "grug" easel Oscar and Elmer would as
children, in spite of their identical makeup, already have
different contents for 'grug'. Bu~ the point of the notion
of narrow content was jU8t to rule this 80rt of thing
out. If narrow content i8 a matter of denotation under
ideal conditions, it had better turn out that 'grug' denotes
the same thing under that idealization whether it's used by
Oscar or Elmer. And furthermore, it had better turn out
that 'water' denotes the same thing for a pair of
doppleganger8 Putnam's original "H20/m" case, in spite
of the fact that a different substance played the
two subjeots' evolutionarytheinroleappropriate
historie••
But if 8uch 80c1al and linguistic faot. are not among
tho•• which our noe•• must be rubbed in to satisfy the
conditione for "almost omniscience", then it 100K8 as if
we're going to have the same kind of "slioing too thin"
problem that we had with conceptual role semantios. For
wlthowt either 8001al and linguistic constraints or a
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teleological grounding for the non-teleologically salient
representationa, there will be what lOOK like lots of
different dntry conditions for (what was at least
intuitively) a given representation, and no way to pick just
thoae which are the truth conditions -- just as there are
lots of different (~onc.ptual roles for it, and no Wlty to
pick just those with the same meaning-
Thi8 is just the sort of point which an example like
Burgels "arthritia" caee brings out. Consider the case of
two people, both of whom have the same "perceptual
stereotype" for arthritic pain, both of whom b~11eve some of
the folK wisdom connected with arthritis (e-9-, it's more
common among old people, it's sometimes worse in the cold,
aeprin help., etc.), but one (rightly) thinks you can only
get it in ~he joint8, and the other doesn't. Now if in
"rubbing their noses" in the world, we don't rub their
noees in things like the fact that experts in their sooiety
use the term in a certain way, it looks like it's going to
turn out that the idealized correlations of tlle1r
repre.entat1on8 'arthritis' will be with different
properties, ~ven if it's plausible to think that the
idealized correlation for the guy who thinks you can only
get arthritis in the joints 1. really with the property of
being arthrit18 (which ia pretty que8tionable), it's surely
not plau8ible to think that this will be the oorrelation for
the guy who do••n't think that. For him, ma~be the
property picked o~t will be 80me di8junctive one (i.e.
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"arthritis or ..... ), but without social or linguistic facts,
or
--
the sorts of facts about microphysical structure
which would defeat the purpose of a notion of narrow
content, it lOOKS as though the denotations will be at least
slightly different. But this is then just the counterpart
of the problem we had with conceptual role semantics I When
are different (idealized denotations / conceptual roles)
aimilar enough for sameneS8 of narrow content?
Let me make a last negative point about the proposal
under consideration before closing with some remarks on
where all this leaves us. One of the things that any useful
idealization needs to do is to resemble the £!!! case
adequately in order to give u8eful explanations of the real
cases and (closely related) to justify the id~a that this
idealization really i8 an idealization of the real cases
that we're worried about. But of cour8e, they don't always
succeed.
market
idealization in economics to perfectly rational
agents, and in political science to perfectly
well-informed votere, are examples where the distance
between real and ideal 1. great enough to strip the
idealization of much explanatory value. And although I
think that idealization to 80me eort of "almost omniscience"
for 80me
-
mental repre8entations (perhaps even the
teleologically salient one_) may in fact be a
methodologically fruitful one[SO), I see no reason to
believe thi. for representations which are, intuitively
speaking, ae "non-ob8ervational" a8 "grug" or "arthritis".
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IX. Concluding RemarKS' Conceptual Role Revisited
Where have we then been left? Well, in 8~ite of the
failure of the denotational approach to give an account of
psychological content in general, I think there's a good bit
to bd taken from the failure (and perhaps, partial success)
of the view. There are, I think, two main positive points
to be taken from all this. one is the possibility of a
denotationsl account of some
-
of our mental
representations, the other is a sU9gestion about the
importance of idealization in this problem. I'll take these
in order.
As for giving an account of the semantic8 of mental
representations which is partly denotational in the way
sU9gested, I think the possibilities are quite open. I
didn't give any argument against the possibility of a
denotational account of the teleologically salient
representations, and I can't think of any roughly
non-empirical argument again8t this idea. The real
roadblock for such a story is making persuasive the idea
that at least 80me subset of our mental representations
are in fact teleologioally salient in a robust enough
-
sense i. e. , that the mechanisme for tokening such
representations are "hard-wired" by the evolutionary
proce.s. rodor has elaewhere[Sl] made a persuasive case
that 80me parts of our cognitive apparatus are not as
pla.tic aa ie often suggested. If this is r19ht (and it is
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at least an open empirical claim), and some cognitive
"modules" (like th~ visual input processor) are
explicitly "hard-wired" by evolution to perform certain
representational tasKs, then the representations of such
modules would be leading candidates for the kind of
denotational approach which has been discu8sed here.[52]
Idealization. the other important point which might be
taken from the foregoing discussion i8 that the notion of
idealization seems like the best idea available for getting
arOUlld the meaning holism problem. And although
idealization to teleologioally defined "normal
circumstances" doesn't do all the work Fodor want from it,
it does suggest another kind of approach which might be
t.aken. Recall that the question which Putanm has faced us
with is th181 How much change 1n conceptual role can you
have before you get a change in content of representation
rather than just a change in belief? And the problem was,
there seemed to be no way that that question could be
answered.
So, said the zen master, unask the question,
Admittedly, there isn't any way to draw the line between
change of meaning and ohange of collateral information. So
don't do it. Idealization gives us a way to not be 80
bothered by this purported failure. The fact to focus on is
that it'. generally true that there's no line to be drawn
between ca8ee which can
--
be subsumed under some
acientifio idealization and those which ~~. There's
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no drawing the line between say, gases which are
sufficiently close to an ideal (or "perfect" if you prefer)
gas for ideal 9a8 laws to explain their behavior and those
which aren't sufficiently cl088. And similarly; there may
be no saying how close the conceptual roles of two
representations have to be to 8ubsume them under the same
intentional explanation; but that doesn't mean intentional
explantion 1s to be left for the poets.[53]
In short, the idea here is to idealize to some
particular Bet of conceptual roles, and stop worrying that
there's no line to be drawn between those conceptual roles
which have tl18 same meaning as the ideal ones and those
which don't. Now before considering quickly a couple of
drawbacks to this outlook, let me suggest one strength in
the present context. If there ar~ in fact, as suggested
above, teleologically interpreted representations which Ije
at the interface between perceptual (and perhaps
motor-control) modules and the rest of the cognitive system,
then these might provide some clas8 of "semantic primitives"
which would have (at least some of) their semantic
properties in virtue of something other than just their
inferential relatione to other representations.[54]
Now one kind of problem with thia approach is that
there doesn't seem to be any obvious preferred
idealization. In the case of idealization in other
ecienoea, there generally doee lOOK to be such a preferred
caee -~ intuitively, one where some of the variables drop
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out. You get to, e.g_, stop worrying about exactly how
elastic the particle 1s, how friction-free the plane is, or
how often the con8ume~ really reads the label. With
meanings, though, it's hard tv see how we could view one
conceptual role as the one which realll had a certain
meaning, whereas the others didn't.(55] Omniscience might
have given such a preferred case, but its problems h~ve
already been pointed out. In fact, in our actual, everyday
application of intentional ascription and explanation,
there's at least some plausibility that it's our own
case that we use as the idealization.[56]
But why should we be so bothered by this? We have, in
term. of Field's conceptual role, a perfectly well-defined
notion of exact Sbmeness and difference of meaning.
There's no obvous reason why which full conceptual schema we
actually choose as the ideal one should be constrained by
anything other than pragmatic success of the explanory
system. Indeed, such a choice may be reasonably viewed as
simply analogous to the choice of a coordinate system. If
we can't find any choice which 1s useful, then we ShOl11d
start to worry. alIt look I just use mine it's okay
with me. If we really ~ use our own cases in practice,
at least you'll have as an idealization a characterization
of meaning- which faoilitat6& (I blush to say) a fair bit of
pragmatic 8uccess in explanation and prediction.
Might not be ideal, but it'll have to do. Know what I
mean?
Meaning Psychologized
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[1] See Stitch (1983), especially chapter 8. I think that
something like this has been assumed by a lot of people
(perhaps implicitly); another place where this sort of line
is pushed explicitly i~ in Fodor (1980a).
[2] This is pe~hap8 the central point of my arguments
against Searle part one of this thesis, "The Chemistry of
Intrinsic Inlentionality."
[3] In Putnam (1975).
[4] Putnam (1975) pp. 233-4.
[5] Putnam (1975) p. 234.
[6] I take it that this is an expansion of Kaplan's line
Which he himself would in fact resist. Although he doesn't
explicitly d1scusa natur~l kind tetms, his position on
proper names (in Kaplan (unpublished), ch. 22) s~9gests what
sort of line he might be inclined to take on this sUbject --
and it's not the one I'm suggesting-
[6] Kaplan, p. 25.
[7] See Kaplan t pp. 19-24 for the initial exposition of his
notion of content.
[BJ For pre.ent purposes, I'll just say, with
the content of an indexical is its referent,
Kaplan, that
although I
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think there's good rea~on to say instead (as Putnam seems
to) that the referent is just one component of the content
of an indexical term another component being something
like the character.
[10] Putnam (1975) pp. 245-6.
[11] Another way to take what Putnam has to say here is to
take him as making a point about how we would translate
between English and Twin Earth English. (Whether he's
suggesting this point here or not, it·s certainlY one he
makes elsewhere e.g., in his paper "Meaning Holism".)
I'll get to this later.
[12J Burge (1982), p. 103.
[13] Burge, p. 103.
(14J Burge, p. 105.
[15] Kaplan, pp. 9-10.
(16) Burge, p. 107.
[17] There's still the difference between natural-kind
terms and the standard indexic41s with respect to which
features of external contexts they are sensitive to in
fixing referents. There' s at least some plausibil i ty tlla t
in the case of the standard indexicals, all that matters is
What's around at the moment to, roughly, be pointed at. But
with the natural kind terms, my history (among other things)
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matters. Just because I may be around XYZ now doesn't make
'water' in my idiolect refer to it. Now although this
surely makeR it hard to say what the referents are 1n any
particular case, I' m l&Ot aure why this should make any
qualitative difference.
[18] Putnam, (1984) p. 7.
[19] Putnam (1984) p. 7.
[20] Putnam (1984), p. 9.
[21J Putnam (1984), p. 9.
[22] Putnam (1984), pp. 9-10.
[23] Putnam (1984), p. 10.
[24] Putnam (1984), p. 13.
[25J See Field (1911).
[26] Fodor, (unpublished-a), pp. 28-9.
[27J Fodor (unpublished-a), p. 21.
[28] Fodor (unpublished"'a), p. 28.
(29) Fodor (unpublished-a), p. 30.
[30J Fodor (unpublished-a), p. 28.
[31J Fodor (unpublished-a), p. 28.
[32] Fodor (unpublished-a), p. 32.
Meaning Psychologized
[33] Dretske (1981), pp. 215-6.
[34] Fodor (unpublished-a), p. 33.
(35] Fodor, (unpublished-b), p. 14.
[36] Fodor (unpublished-b) , p. 44.
[37] Fodor (unpublished-b) , p. 37.
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[38] Fodor makes this distinction himself on p. 60 of the
"Psychosemantics" artiole, where he is talking about the
cognitive system of a froy: "In one sense, a cognitive
system is functioning normally whenever it does whatever
intact cognitive systems do. In that sense, fly-detector
neurons are functioning normally when they respond to moving
spots. In another sense, however, a normally functioning
cognitive system is one that is doing whatever it is that
cognitve systems were designed to do. It'a true that,
in this sense, false positives to spots are abnormal. n
(39J Fodor ( forthcoming) , p. 17.
[40J Fodor (forthcoming), p. 22.
[41J Fodor (forthcoming), p. 23.
[42J Fodor (unpublished-b) , p. 60.
(43J Fodor (unpublished·...b) , pp. 38-9.
[44J Fodor (unpublished-b) , pp. 50-1.
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[45] Fodor (unpublished-b) , pp. 58.
[46] Fodor (unpublished-b) , pp. 51.
[47] Fodor (unpublished-b) , pp. 50.
[48] Fodor ( forthcoming) , p. 22.
[49] Fodor (unpublished-b) , pp. 53.
[50] It's in fact plausible to think that what limited
successes behaviorism did have depended on something very
much like this sort of idealization.
(51J See Fodor (1983).
[52] There may also be the possibility that such hard-wiring
is done not through the evolutionary process, but through
the developmental one. I in fact think kind of approach
may hold some promise, in spite of such problems as that of
distinguishing the sort of developmental process from
cognitive processes in general. A topic for another time.
[53J This is, of course, a use of standard move #1 in
philosophy of psychology; "Sure, it's a problem -- but it's
a problem for 'legitimate' sciences too."
[54J The importance of this sort of "grounding" of
oonoeptual roles is also discussed in the other two sections
of this thesis.
[55J As Ned Block has pointed out to me, it may be even
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worse than this. In the other good idealization cases, we
have something like a similarity metric for saying what
counts as being clo~er to the idealization -- e.g., in the
case of gases, smaller particles, etc. However, in the case
of conceptual roles, it's hard to see how to chara~terize
such a thing.
[56] This point is made nicely in Stitoh (1982).
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In this paper, I will try to examine some ~~nnections
between two kinds of ap~ropches to thinking about the
intentionality the aboutnes8, directedness, or
••mantic relatedness -- of consciousness: on the one hand,
that of roughly HU88erlian phenomenology; and on the other,
the sort of approach which is suggested by the currently
80mewhat fashionable view of the mind as a computational
ayatem. In doing this, I will focus on the comments and
argument" in the area which have been put forth by Hubert
Dreyfus, and will emphasize 1n particular the statement of
hie p08ition on this i8sue which 18 given in his in
introduction to his anthology, Husserl,
Intentionality, and
.....--
Cogniti'!! Science. I
.hould say here at the start that this isn't really a paper
on au•••rl. Rather than trying to engAge in any kind of
Hu••arl 8cholariship, I will for the most part be concerned
with Hu•••r11an phenomenology as viewed by Dreyfus. I will,
however, on occasion try to point out ways in which a
.lightly 41ff.rent under8tan41ng of what Husserl himself has
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to say may help in avoiding some of the problems sU9gested
by Dreyfus.
The first thing that I want to try to put aside is a
certain kind of worry about consciousness taken in the
slightly mysterious and mystical sense it often is. What I
would like to do for present pUpOS8S is not to worry
about the "riddle of conciouene8s", whatever that is. If
there'. a riddle of consciousness, not only do I not know
the punch line, I don't even know the straight man's part.
In not concerning myself with this, I'm simply going to
follow Dreyfus' lead. In his attempt to avoid these thorny
problems, and in trying to bring out the interesting
connection he see8 between HU88erlian phenomenology and
cognitiviam, Dreyfus makes the following claima
••• for Husserl, like Kant, the notion of mental
activity 18 80 broadened that it does not require
consciousness at all. Indeed, Kant and Husserl
are precursors of cognit1v!sm precisely because
their rules operate like programs totally
independently of the awareness of a consoious
8ubject.[lJ
Whether this 18 in fact true or not is, I think, somewhat
up for grabs. However, for the most part, I'll simply bUy
the line that Dreyfus 18 giving here, and focus instead on
hi. independent worries about the relationship between the
two viewe at hand.
II. Bracketing and Methodolog1cal Solipsism
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Rather than then telling us something about the
somewhat mystical nature of conoc!ousness, Dreyfus sees
"what he [Husserl] considered his most important di.scovery"
as that of "the special realm of entities revealed by tlle
transcendental phenomenological reduction."[2] Now the
transcendental phenomenological reduction is a "reduction"
of the subjeot matter of a discipline phenomenology, or
phenomenological psychology to just that which is
available to reflection once all knowledge of the real,
external world has been "put aside" or -- as Husserl puts
it -- "bracketed." This act of "brack.eting" which
Husserl calls the "epoohe" (abstention) is not a
denial of the existence of the real world, or a
reduction or redefinition of claims about the world 1n terms
of what's left after the epoche, but is simply a bit of
the methodology of phenomenology- In bracketing, we are
told, "I do not then deny this "world", as though I
were sophist, I do not doubt that
it is there 88 though I were sceptic, but I
use the "phenomenological" epoche, which comlt!letely
bars
-
me from
-
using ~t;lement
which
existence
concerns
(daeien) ...... [3] Or
spatio
a8 David
-~<emeoral
Woodruff
Smith and Ronald McIntyre put it in their book, Husserl
and
-
Intentionality. A Study in
Meaning !2a LangUAse.
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A "reduction" in Husserl's sense is a
methodological device for "reducing", or
narrowing down, the scope of one's inquiry.
Importantly, then, Husserl's reductions are not
ontological reductions, whereby entities of
one category are defined or eliminated in terms of
entities of some other category (as aome have
sought to reduce physical objects to sense-data,
or minds to bodi~8, or values to facts, and 80
on). Rather, tne purpose of Husserl's reductions
is that of 8ucc8sively delimiting the sUbject
matter of phenomenology. [4]
Now as for the actual practice or use of bracketing
itself, I won't have much to say. What I do want to focus
on here is the nature of what Dreyfus calls "the special
realm of entities revealed by the transcendental
phenomenological reduction." This realm of entities and the
operations defined over them form, for Husserl, the sUbject
matter of phenomenological psychology; and what is critical
about these entities 1s, Dreyfus tells us, the following,
What is essential to phenomenological
peycholo9Y is that there be an autonomous
realm whose rule-like operation can be understood
without reference to the activity of the brain,
without asking whether anything is actually
causally affecting our sense organs, without
deciding whether the natural world is or is not
the way science tells us it is, without asking
whether any of our intentional states are actually
8ati8~ied, and, moat generally, without taking a
stand on whether anything at all exists for our
mental states to be satisfied by.[S]
It 18 this central use of the notion of an autonomous,
rule governed realm of mental operations whioh is the
oritical tie between Husserl's phenomenology and the
cognitiv1et1c outlOOK. The independence of the taxanomy of
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mental states from considerations involvin9 the external
world -- the idea that mental states are what they are
independent of what the exterllal world is 1ike 1.8
embodied for Husserl in the notion of bracKetin9' But
this very same idea, Dreyfus says, is central to the
cognitivistic outlook, and is captured there by the notion
of methodological solipsism.
The idea of methodological solipsism is most clearly
spelled out in Jerry Fodor's article "Methodological
Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive
Psychology", and it is Fodor's version of the view which
Dreyfus considers explicl~ly. Thus, although 1 1 m not in
absolute agreement with Fodor's characterization of this
outlooK, it's nonetheless the obvious place to start
considering the view. For Fodor, methodological solipsism
is a rdquirement placed on psychology by another closely
related supposition the formality condition. The
formality condition, when added to the thesis that mental
states and processes are representational i.e. that
"all such states can be viewed as relations to
representations and all such processes as operations defined
on representations"(6) gives what Fodor calls the
computational theory of ~.
What then 18 the constraint whioh the formality
condieion places on the representational theory of the
mind? Ae Fodor puts itl
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Formal operations are the ones that are specified
without reference to such semantic properties of
representations as, for example, truth, reference,
and meaning •••• formal operations apply in terms
of the, as it were, shapes of the objects in their
domains •••• [7] ••• the formality condition, viewed
in this context, is tantamount to a sort of
methodological solipsism. If mental processes are
formal, then they have access only to the formal
properties of such representatiolls of the
environment as the senses provide. Hencd, they
have no access to the semantic properties of
such representations, including the property of
being true, of having referents, or, indeed, the
property of being representations of the
environment. [8]
However, not all of semantics is left behind by the
formality condition, for, we are told,
••• the content of a representation is a (type)
individuatIng feature of mental states .... But,
now, if the computational theory of mind is
true (and if, as we may assume, content is a
semantical notion par excellance) it tollows that
content alone cannot distinguish thoughts. More
~xactly, the computational theory of the mind
requires that two thoughts can be distinct in
content only if they can be identified with
relations to formally distinct representations.[9]
So methodological solipsism (or, if you prefer, tlle
:ormality condition), like Husserl'. bracketing, makes the
assumption that that the "external" properties of our
intentional states, such as what particular real object they
happen to be about, or whether or not they happen to be
true, are outside the scope of what psychology sllould lOOK
at. And similarly, Dreyfus says, "this bracketing of the
concerns of naturalism, along with the implicit denial of
the causal component of reference, makes HUBsert a
Husserlian Bracketing in Cognitive Science page 118
methodological solipsist."[lO] Indeed, Dreyfus takes
HU8serl's move from his earlier (pre-transcendental
reduction) views in Logical Investigations to his
post-reduction views 1n Ideas and later works to
essentially the move of adding the formality condition to
his representational theory of mind. As he puts it;
HU8serl's theory of intentionality developed
through two stages. The first stage corresponds
exactly to wllat Jerry Fodor, in his artiel e on
methodological solipsism, calls the
representational theory of mind; and, we shall
argue, the second stage may be linked to what
Fodor calls the computational theory of
representations. [11)
Now I take it t1,ere is at least aome initial
inclination to think that the same things are supposed to be
"bracketed" by, one the one hand, the formality condition,
and on the other, the transcendental reduction. For 8urely
both require that claims about the existence of particular
external objects, the succeS8 or failure of attempts to
refer, and the trutl& or falsi ty of representations must be
bracketed; but that what makes a particular representation
the intentional type that it 18 is the sort of thing which
will not be bracketed. Furthermore, the two views would
88em to share at least two oentral motivations for making
the methological reduction of sUbject matter via bracketing
and the formality condition.
One ie the O)V laus one a (tentative, anyway)
acceptance of the roughly Cartesian intuition that our
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mental states could have been exactly as they are regardless
of the state of or even existence of the external world.
It's hard to see exactly how to argue for this, but it's
certainly something that people typically take to be not
only plausible but obvious. The second shared motivation is
a little leS8 obvious, but perhaps more important. This is
the desire to get a science of the mind which is in a
certain sense "presuppositionless". Now for Husserl, the
sense in which the science of the mind is supposed to be
"presupposit1onless" 1s often taken to be that of something
like standard epistemological foundational ism i.e.
depending on only the "indubitably given foundations" of,
presumably, something like sense-data. I'm inclined to
reject this way of viewing Husserl's epistemology
(particularly as it appears in his later works), but I won't
argue the point here. Suffice it instead to point out that
Husserl seems to be particularly interested in not
presupposing any other science or body of scientific
knowledge. The references to the bracketing of scientific
knowledge in particular appear constantly in Husserl's
writings, e'9' , "Thus sciences which relate
me to
-
this
..-.
natural world ••• though I am
far from any thought of objeoting to them in the least
degree,
one
-
of
I disconnect
serves
them
-
me
-
all .••
for
no
a
foundation".[12]
It is this latter way of being "presuppositionless"
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i.e. not presupposing some other science6 -- which is a
central motivation for methological solipsism in cognitive
science as well. For, the moral of the recent literature on
meaning and the fixation of reference goes, the meanings and
extensions of at least some terms depend on facts about
"hidden essences" of the things we refer to, and what
science can tell us about them. According to the post 1970's
conventional wisdom, 'water' refers to H20 and 'salt'
refers to ~, whether the user knows any chemistry or
not. Hence, whether a thought "water is wet" is about
water or not "depends on whether it's about H20; and
whether it's about H20 aepends on 'how science turns out' --
viz., on what chemistry 1s true."[13] So if individuation
of contents (and hence mental states) is done via their
"external" semantic features (like their referents), we
won't be able to type-individuate mental states without
finishing up our chemistry (and presumably the rest of our
sciences) first. As Fodor puts it: "No doubt it' s all r 1911t
to have a research strategy that says 'wait awhile'. But
who wants to wait forever?"[14] Thus, since not
honoring the formality condition seems to make the project
of intentional psychology hopeless, all we can do is hope
for a psychology which does honor it -- one which, as
Husserl puts it, "puts out of action" these naturalistic
notions.
What
suggestion
I'd like to do now is tentatively accept Dreyfus'
that these central notions in the two views
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really do come to the more or less the same thing: that both
views are adopting the same central construct of an
"autonomous" realm of rUle-governed prooesses which are
taxonomized idependently of their r~lat1onships (causal or
semantic) to the external world -- an external world which
they are nonetheless in fact semantically directed upon.
The question I'll now turn to: What's wrong with that?
III. What's wrong with bracketing, part 1: Meaning Holism
The central problem for the notion of bracketing or
methodological solipsism is what's sometimes called the
problem of the cackground. The idea is this: A
representation doesn't have the content that it does singly
or in any way which is independent of the other
representations in the same network. There is, to use
Husserl's term, an "infinite horizon" of meanings and
intentional states against which each representational
content or "noema" functions; and without that
bacKground, the representational state does not have the
same content.
One way to view the problem is this: Once braoketing
or the formality condition is adopted, what's left are the
relationships between the representational states.
Roughly, the sort of content which is left looks as though
it must be determined by formally oharacterizable (loosely,
syntactic) interactions relations to the other
repesentational states (including perceptual ones). In the
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current literature in the philosophy of mind, the idea that
of conceptual role semantics. What gives a
representation its oonceptual role is its connections within
the conceptual or inferential network- Similarly, what
makes a noema the one that it is is the fact that it
conllects (or "synthesizes") representations: For example,
what makes a noema that of "house" is that it synthesizes
our beliefs (e.g. the belief that houses are often wooden),
our perceptual presentations (e.g- the appearance of the
front of a house), and our expectations (e_g_ that a house
won't usually disappear instantaneously)-
Problem: Which of the connections in the
representational network are constituitive of a
representation's content; i.e. whicn synthesizing
connections are essential to being that noema? Of course,
~ representation "house" is directly inferentially tied
to things as idiosyncratic as memories of feeling guilty
about breaking a window on the green one inhabited by Mrs.
Elhart which was next door to my pal:-ent~ • house 1 and
indirectly tied to my beliefs about an~t'thin9 you like --
say, moral philosophy. The problem is that there doesn't
look to be any way in principle tc separate these
connections from conneotions which mi9ht seen to be more
essential to the content of the representation.
Now I'm inclined to think that this is a deep problem,
and not one easily solved. If beliefs about anything you
like oan affeot beliefs about anything else -- i.e. if
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epistemological holism is true and if all we have
for psychological content are the (roughly) epistemological
or inferential relationships between representations, then
it's ha4d to see how we're going to avoid meaning
holism.[lS] But for present purposes (and maybe in
general), its not obvious that this is such a problem, If
we simply admit that the horizon of each noema is infinite,
and that the representational content or conceptual role
does depend on the totality of a representations
inferential role within a system, what do we lose? We still
have a notion of meaning which doesn't have to "presuppose"
(in the above-mentioned more specific sense) any science.
What we don't have is, first, a notion of the content of a
representaion which is coarse enough to include different
people, or even the same person over changes in beliefs.
This is, I think, a problem for Husserl's project of
"eidetic reduction" the reduction to essences. And
second, the task of spelling out any given noema or
conceptual role will be, to say the least, monumental. As
Dreyfus says,
During twenty-five years of trying to spell out
the components of the noema of everyday objects,
Husserl found that he had to include more and more
of a subject's common-sense understanding of the
everyday world.... he concluded... that
phenomenology was an "infinite task".[16]
However, one might hope that it's one we might actually
be able to start. We all know that the inferential
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connections of, say, 'water' to 'liquid' and 'drinkable'
are, in some sense, more important and intimate than it's
connection to 'baseball' and 'quark'. That's at least a
place to start. In any case, an "infinite task" may not be
so hot, but it surely seems better than one you have to wait
forever to start.
I'm not trying to suggest this isn't a deep and
troubling problem. However, I do want to suggest that (1)
for the reasons above, it might not be as bad as it first
looks; (2) there may be some kind of way around it (see the
end of part 2 of this thesis for some suggestions about
this); (3) it's not any new or speoial problem 1'nat comeR up
from the parallel between cognitivism and Husserl, but
rather one which Quine (and Putnam in some of his moods) has
been throwing around for thirty years; and most importantly
for present purposes, (4) it doesn't seem to be the one
which Dreyfus is actually trying to get at himself. It's
the problem which Dreyfus is instead trying to present that
I'll now turn to.
IV. What's wrong with bracketing, part 2: skills
The problem which Dreyfus is instead worried about is
that representational structures alone are inadequate for a
theory of mind -~ or, as he likes to say, for an account of
human understanding- For, as he says in his criticism of
"Methodological Solipsism", the cognitivist (Fodor irl this
case), not to mention Husserl, "needs an account of how one
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determines the quality of an act, that is, a theory of
taking-to-be-true, even within his solipsistic method.[17]
Roughly, the claim is just that both theories of mind need
to give some kind of account of fixation of belief -- and in
particular, beliefs which themselves involve semantj.c
notions like truth and reference. But the problem is not
just that euch the f~xation of such beliefs gives the best
kind of example of the effects of epistemological holism;
rather, it's rather (Dreyfus claims) that the sorts of
epistemological background agaist which justification is
made is not simply representational. The epistemological
holism of belief fixation here shows that if (as it should)
a theory of mind is to give an account of such belief
fixatioll, it's going to have to be "conunitted to capt.uring
the intentional structure and mental operations involved in
all forms of intelligent behavior, even pragmatic,
contextual jnteractions with objects and people in the
physical and social world.[18] But then:
The crucial question becomes: Can the
taken-for-granted everyday common-sense lJackground
presupposed in assigning satisfaction conditions
to every intentional state be treated as a belief
system which can be analyzed in terms of the
intentional content of each of its oonstituent
beliefs? Or is the background rather a
combination of skills, practices, discriminations,
etc., which are not intentional states, and so, a
fortiori, do not have the some of intentional
content whioh could be explicated in terms of
formal rules?[19]
Husserl, we're told, must (and does) take tile former
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option; the realm of abstract rules is all he has left after
bracketing, and so if he 18 to give an account of belief
fixation, of taking-to-be-true and taking-to-refer, it must
be given in just these terms. Dreyfus' statement of the
point here.
HU.8e~1 thus accepts Heide9ger's argument that
each noeme functions only against the practical
horizon of the life-world, and then claims tJ-,at
the•• background practices themselves are really a
.et of ....dimented.. ba.cKground 8ssum)?tiona,
each of which has its own noematic conten~, which
need only be "reactivated" by the
phenomenologist.[20]
The question to ask here, of cours~, is why Dreyfus
think. (he says, la Heide9ger) the background
again8t which mental activity takes place must be taken to
have a non-representational character? And the answer, as
already implied above, i8 thial The contents of our
intentional states depend intrinsically on the relationships
they bear to skills (including, importantly,
perceptual on•• 1 ••• abilities to diacriminate); and
the•• skills cannot themeelves be considered
repr•••nt4tional stat•• or processes.
Now on one way ot understanding Dreyfus' talk about
skill. here, it'. juet plain hard to 8e8 why we should
believe this laet point. This way i. to empt,aaize the
Heic1e9gerian talk about the ".oclally organized nexus" which
he tend. to elide into in this context, e.g.1
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When we use a piece of equipment like a hammer,
Heidegger claims, we actualize a bodily skill
(which cannot be represented in the mind) in the
context of a socially organized nexus of
equipment, purposes, and human roles (Which cannot
be represented as a eet of facts). This context
and our everyday ways of skillful coping in it are
not something we know but, as part of our
socialization, form ~way that we !£!.[21]
He 1s, it would seem, gl08sing together a couple of
disparate points here. One.i s the olaim that the "context
of a socially organized nexus ••. cannot be represented as a
set of facts". Now the earlier points about epistemological
and meaning holi8m may show us that this social context is
(almost) infinitely complex, but nothing 80 far hAS shown us
that it's not representable as an (admittedly unbeleivably
complex) set or network. of "facts" or contentful
representations. A big set is still a set. What's needed
for Dreyfus' point is to show that skills, as they enter
into the total intentional network (the "lebenswelt")
are e8sentially bound up with 8ometh.ng other than
repre8entational 8tates and proceeses_ So what we need to
look for is something problematic about skills other than
the fact that they, like everything else, are involved in
the holistic network. So let's look.
There would seem to be two distinct ways of
understanding Dreyfu8' worries here skills. One is as a
concern about the tea8ability of giving an explanation of
how we accompli8h skillful behavior (including managing
perceptual taak. like that of identifying an objecL as
being, say, a chair) in term. of computations and
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representations; the other 1s as a worry about what might be
called the essentially "world directed" nature of
perception. mlat I'll do is finish this section by talking
breifly about the first of thesu, and then focus on the
second in the next section.
The fir8t problem -- the sU9gestion that it's somehow
unr.asonabl. to try to give an account of how we accomplish
produce sKilful behavior from within a computational
framework -- seems clearly to be the sort of question to be
answered by theory-building in cognitive science rather than
by philo8ophical reflections. It 1s, I take it, a
substantive issue whether skills or perception (or for that
matter, any kind of mental process) can reasonably be
explained at a at a higher level of abstraction -- that of
computations and representations -- than the that of some
non-computational science -- say, neurophysiology- Perhaps
it can·t, and no computational theory of such processes is
forthcoming (or true).[22] But this will depend on How
Research Turns Out. The present question is whether,
pre~re.earch, we have 80me good reason to think th~t a
computational account of (say) perception 8hould be ruled
out.
A. far aa I can ••e, Dreyfus really doesn't give much
in the way of reasons for believing this. What he does have
to offer here, though, 8eeme to fall into two categoried.
One, the 1... inter••t1ng, consiate of reflections on how
armchair coneideratione in favor of thinking of skills
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aa rule-governed really aren't 80 powerful. For example (1n
talking about a case which, I'm afraid, doesn't a9ply too
well to perception) I
.••when a skilled performer is asked how he does
what he does, he often tell you the only thing he
knows, viz., the sequence of operations he once
followed in acquiring the skill, but that does not
mean he now follows those steps or any others, and
the flexibility and success of the skill sU9gesLs
that rule. no longer playa functional role.[23]
Here, the suggestion is that consciously accessible
rule. or procedures may well play a role in the learning of
a skill, but shouldn't be taken to c~nt1nue to playa role
once that skill has been thoughly le~rned. Learning a dance
i8 a good example of thisl after learning a dance, we at
least cease to be conscious of the procedures (e-g. "first
move the right foot back, then the left foot in •.• ) we used
in learning.[24] As far as this sort of introspective
·'evidenc." fo the rule.-governed natur of skills 90es ,
however, I'm perfectly inclined to agree with Dreyfus on
it'. statue. How we say we do things can often be
confabulation, what's critical for deoiding about rules and
representations as the basi. of skillful behavior isn't
intoepective evidence, but (a8 I said earlier) the 8uccass
ot 8cientifio theory~bu11ding from with this perpe8otive.
The eecond (clo.ely related) category of considerations
offered by Dreyfu8 against the pretheoretioal plausibility
of a rule-governed aocount of skills revolve around the
difference. between skill-governing processes and
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conscious inferential processes. If we use rules anJ
representations in, say, the solving of perceptual tasKs,
they at least aren't ones to which we have conscious access;
we don't have introspective access to how we solve these
problems, even of the restricted sort we have to how we
~~n8ciou81y accomplish tasKS or solve problems by "figuring
them out." But why should this bother us? Why Sho'11dn' t we
think that some of the rules and representations used in
mental processing are not consciously accessible? ~~is is
not only perfectly reasonable for (and commonly used by)
cognitivists, but importantly for present purposes --
also for Husserl, given Dreyfus' characterization of his
account being centrally concerned with the supposition of a
realm of formal rules involved in mental processes rather
than with the "mystical realm" of consciousnesa (see seotion
(I) of this paper).[2S]
V. What's wrong with bracketing, part 3: world-ciirectedness
of perception
Aside from these kinde of ooncerns then, how does
bracketing affect how we view the role of perception in
mental activity? To start with, as Dreyfus rightly points
out in his article "Hu88erl's Perceptual Noema n ,
••• Hueserl must, therefore [given bracketing],
abandon ~n account of outer intuition. He must
treat perception AS referentially opaque and
oonfine himself to what we take there to be rather
than what 1. given. He can study the oonditions
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of the possibility of evidence, confirmation,
etc., but never It's actuality.[26]
Surely this 18 right. Once we have bracketed the
world -- or taken the solipsistic turn -- perceptual states
and representations must, like any mental states and
representations, be seen as playing their role in mental
processes purely in virtue of their formal or syntactic
properties. Just as truth and falsity of concep~ualized
beliefa are abstracted from, 80 is veridicality of
perception. As far as a theory of mental activity goes,
perfect hallucination is as good a8 the real thing- It
should, however, be once again emphasized that this does
not mean that Husserl doesn't think there's a
difference between perfect hallucination and veridical
perception. It's just that this difference isn't a
difference for phenomenology (or phenomenological
psychology) to be concerned with.
As we saw earlier, what was left of the semantic
properties of mental states after reduction was, on Fodor's
statement, the content of the representations
individuated opaquely, and on Hueserl'e, the act' 8
intentionality or "direotedness". As Dreyfus says, in
ideas HU88erl "argued that an act of consciousness, ••
has intentionality only by virtue of an 'abstract form' or
noema correlated with the act"[27J, that 1s, "that the
representational content 1s realized
entity -- the noema ...... C28J
as an abstract
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As for the case of the contents of perceptual states,
however, Dreyfus tells us that (note again the
characterization of perception as a skill) It unlike
Husserils conceptualized noema, skills are not ideal,
abstractable meanings. They cannot be entertained apart
from aome particular activation •••• "[29] But nonetheless,
these perce~tu~l states playa fundamental role of reean1ng;
as he goe8 on to say, ..... these perceptual skills, like
noemata, are the means throug~ which we refer to and
unify the objects of experience ...... [30] So perception,
like noemata, is seen by Dreyfus as playing exactly the kind
of role that contentful states are to play means of
reference, synthesizers of presentations (e.g. moments of
time, slightly different perspectives on objects) -- but i8
not, as noemata are, a matter of "ideal, abstractable
meanings".
Now the suggestion that "perceptual skills are not
ideal, abstractable meanings" or to put in one of
Dreyfus' more understandable ways, that acta of perception
don't have abetractable meanings -- is most often tied up
with the sorta of considerations which I discussed in the
immediately preceeding section of this paper. The usual
line of argument thus goes, "perception isn't a matter of
rules and representations, hence perceptual states don't
have abstract meanings." But if I'm right in claiming that
Dreyfus doe8n't give any good reason for thinking that
perception isn't representational, or any for thinking that
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either Husserl or a cognitivist must think that, then what
reason is there to believe Dreyfus here? The only sort of
independent consideration offered seems to be the comments,
like the one in the quoted passage above, that perceptual
states "cannot be entertained apart of some particular
activation." Indeed, in a passage like this one, this
latter point seems almost to be offered as a gloss on the
idea that perceptual states don't have "abstractable
meanings". The question is, even if it's true, why should
this matter?
There are, as I see it, two ways to understand the the
claim that perceptual states cannot be entertained apart
from some particular activation. One is as the fairly
straightforward idea that there are mental states which we
can only as a matter of fact be put in by certain kinds of
stimulations of our sensory transducers, or perhaps the
afferent nerves from those transducers. And although it's
not obvious what we should say about, say, hallucination
here, there's surely something clearly right about the claim
when it's taken in this way. Right, but pretty mundane.
The sorts of mental presentations you can typically, as it
were, generate at will (by, for example, imagination), are
different from those typically generated by perception -- at
least in terms of vividness, inescapability, and so on. But
80 what? Two point81 First, Why should this be thought of
as a differenoe in content of the states? And second,
even if you think it should be thought of in that way (e.g.
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you think that the kind of response given to the problem of
meaning holism earlier requires it), why should that bother
us? Once again, it might seem to pose a problem for a
Husserlian view about the role of reflection in the
consideration of mental contents, in that there could be
contents which could not be entertained (1 • e •
representations which could not be tokened) just by
sitting in the armchair and engaging in phenomenological
investigation. But even if that's right, it doesn't seem to
pose any special kind of puzzle for the view which is (as
Dryfus acknowedges see above) both more central to
Husserl's account of mental activity, and shared with the
cognitivist -- view of mental activity as absract and
rule-governed. After all, as Dreyfus at one point admits,
••• Husserl himself suggests that in doing
phenomenological ~Ch0109Y we could as well
consult a test sub ect as consult ourselves, and
it seems equally possible that we could just as
well hypothesize the elements and structures or
deduce them from overt behavior.C3l]
The second way in which to understand the "no
entertaining perceptual states apart from a particular
activation" assertion is slightly different, and, I think,
much more interesting. Here, the idea is to take this as a
claim about th~ essentially non-solipsistic character of the
semantio properties of perceptual states. On this way of
understanding the point, the special conneotion between a
perceptual state and, as Dreyfus likes to say, ita
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"conditions of satisfaction"[32], is ~ just, as in the
suggestion above, the contingent one of those conditions 1n
the world being (normally) the only way to get that state to
occur. Rather, the connection is more intimate. It is,
roughly, that what makes the perceptual state the one that
it is -- what determines its content or its contribution to
the content of our mental states is is the fact that it
presents certain real external objects (or perspectival
presentations of objects) in the world. Or to put it
slightly differently: The contribution of perception to the
(opaquely individuated, or narrow) contents of our
mental states is not just a matter of the conceptual role of
those perceptual states with respect to our other mental
representations, but also depends on the relationships of
those perceptual states to things which don't survive
bracketing states of the external world. Perceptual
states, on this reading, can't be separated from their
particular activations in the sense that they can't be
viewed as having the representational contents they do if
you abstract from what states of the world they are actually
semantically directed at. There is, as it were, no fully
opaque reading of their contents.
criticizing Husserl at one point:
As Dreyfus says in
•.. it is only one step -- albeit a very dubious
one -- from normal logioal reflection directed
toward the ideal oorrelates of referentially
opaque oonoeptual !£l! to a speoial kind
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of reflection, the phenomenological reduction, in
which Husserl claims to abstract the meanings of
the referentially transparent acts of
perception as well.[33]
Now I in fact believe that the central point here is
correct. In fact, I have elsewhere -- in "The Chenlistry of
Intrinsic Intentionality", particularly section IV -- gone
to some length in trying to make this point clearly and
persuasively. So, rather than repeating such arguments
here, let me instead accept the point from present purposes,
and see what this suggests 1n the present context.
VI. Three grades of Semantic Involvement
So there would seem to be components of content tied
with perceptual states which don't survive bracketing- The
questions to ask then are (1) to what degree does this
conflict with Husserl's line on intentionality, and (2) how
does this bear on the parallel move of methodological
solipsism in cognitive science? So first, let me re-aSK the
question: What role does the noema perform with repeat to
meaning? Husserl often says that it's only the noema
that matters for intentionality, and Dreyfus takes this to
mean that the noema is all there is to "representational
content" or "meaning". Dreyfus' linea
The noema, as conceivea by Husserl, is a complex
entity that has a difficult -- perhaps impossibly
diffioult job to perform. It must account for
the mind's directedness towards objects,
Therefore it must contain three components. One
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component must pick out a particular object
outside the mind, another component must provide a
"description" of that object under some aspect,
and a third component must add a "description" of
the other aspects which the object picked out
could exhibit and still be the same object. In
short, the noema must "refer", "describe", and
"synthesize. "[34]
This is an important passage. Firat and foremost, it
needs to be emphasized that the noema alone needn't
guarantee of any particular object outside the mind that
it be picked out. That is to say, Husserl is not
giving a theory of reference, or an account of de re
attitudes. The noema is that part of what's
phenomenologically accessible which is relevant to the
fixation of reference. Nothing else "within" conciousness
is relevant. The question is whether that means that
nothing else is relevant at all. And the answer
(Husserl's and the right one) is of course "no". The
referent or intentional object of an intentional state is,
on Husserl's view, not any mystical entity, but rather the
real (typically physical) object at which it's directed. As
he says, "I perceive the thing, the object of nature, the
tree there in the garden; that and nothing else is the real
object of the perceiving 'intention.' A second immanent
tree ••• is nowise given •••• "[35] Or as Dreyfus puts it,
"For Husserl ••• [an] act successfully refers, however, only
if there is in fact an object with properties exactly as
intended. [36]
A quiok di9ressiona Husserl sometimes has been
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held to have been trying to give a theory of, as it were,
de re attitudes, but the reasons for ascribing this
to him are bad ones. Let me breifly mention them; they are,
I think, of three kinds: The first is on the basis of an
idealist (or even phenomenalist) reading of his metaphysical
views. Now I'm inclined to think that this is the wrong way
to interpret the metaphysical implications of Husserl's
work, but I won't argue the point here. For present
purposes, let me just point out that if Husser1 •s tl"eory of
intentionality depends fundamentally on some kind of
phenomenalist metaphysics, the interest in it a& a precursor
to cognitive science diminishes considerably. What we were
looking for was hints to an account of how intentionality is
related to the material world, not how the material world is
"created" via intentional states.
The second reason for ascribing to Husserl the attempt
to give an acount of de re attitudes comes from
running together his pre-phenomenological reduction views
(primarily in the Logical Investigations) with the
views he held during his "pure phenomenology" period, to
which Ideas was central. In the earlier work, before
Husserl adopted the "bracketing" approach, he did concern
himself in part with giving a acoount of, for example,
demonstrative reference. But the faot that he was concerned
with such 30 account in the period before he adopted the
view that bracketing was central to the methodology of the
science of the mind certainly doesn't itself show th4t he
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was still trying to give such an account -- or that he
thought such an account was possible -- once bracketing had
been adopted.
This kind of reason is sometimes conjoined with the
third sort of reason for this view, which is based on a
reading of what Husserl says about about the notion of the
"determinable X" in the lloema, primarily in chapter 11 of
Ideas, "Noematic Meaning and Relation to the Object." A
good example of this is to be found in David Smith and
Ronald McIntyre's work on this; both in their book
Husserl and Intentionality, and, perhaps even
more clearly, in McIntyre's article "Intending and
Referring." The claim there is that Husserl wants tlle
"determinable Xu of the noema to be, as McIntyre says,
"correlated with the object itself" (i.e. the referent);
and that the X is a "'non~descriptive' component of sense ...
which presents an act's object directly."[37] Now I won't
go into this in detail, as it's slightly Quside the scope of
the present discussion, but I think it is worth pointing out
here that what Husserl is concerned with here is once again
not
-
relation to the referent of an act, but
something like a consideration of the logical form of
judgements. The "determinable Xu is to capture the notion
of "having a partiicualr one in mind" rather than that of a
de re attitude.[38] There are, I believe, cleal
textual considerations in favor of taking Husserl this way
(e.y. the fact that in this context he al~ays puts 'objeot'
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of semantic
intended to
(or in the
in quot•• , hi. standard device for signifying that he is
using a term with ita poat-bracketing, "altered" meanin"3
[39], and his admonishment in the middle of the present
discue.ion that "it must not be forgotton that all our
discue.ione, including the on•• now before us, are to be
understood in the sense of the phenomenologicl
reductions ...... [40] ) • And in any caee, it would 8eem tllll t
this reading 1. aU99••ted by the guidlinea of rational
reconstruction, the i. wo~k i., at least in the present
context, more inter••ting and relevant if taken in this way.
However, I said this wasn't a paper on Husserl, 80 let
.e get back to the point at hand. The point ia, given the
way I'm taking Hu•••rl, that at least aome semantic
properti•• -- reference. and of course truth value are
not just a matter of the no.ma itaelf. The noema may be
the vehicle of reference, but it needn't be the noema alone
which determine. for itself a particular real object.
Con.lderat1on. involving the actual state of the external
world l1ke wh,~t objects it oontains, and which I
perceptually interact with may also enter into the
determination of what (if any) particular object outsiJe the
mind 1. picked out. This 18, of course, a contemptously
familiar point from recent discus.iona of indexicality in
the philo80phy of languAge.[41]
80 there i. one of our tfthree grades
involvement" which the noema 1••eemingly not
capture. that of reference and ~ruth value
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fashionable l1ngo, "wide content"). But there are, as noted
above, differences in "narrow contellt II which are a Inatter
~ simply of relations between representations, but a
matter of the relationships of perceptual representations to
the external world. To take a 8imple example (which I have
tried to exploit elaewhere)a the narrow conte~t8 of color
terms their meanings 48 "opaquely individuated" for use
in the explanation of behavior -- depend essentially on what
prop.r~1.8 in the world they are perceptually related to in
the right way. But this perceptual relationship 18 exactly
the sort of thi~g which will not survive bracketing- So,
bracketing doesn't give narrow content. Two questionsl (1)
Doea this mean that the use of the notion of narrow content
in cognitive science 18 out, because it isn't captured by
thi. way of understanding the requirement of "methodological
.olip.i8m"? An~ (2) does this rule out the level of noema
or formal rule. alone a8 a reasonable level of consideration
of intentionality? The answers here are, I think, "no" and
·'no·· • Here'. why,
Qu••ticn (1). Reoall that the critical motivation for
the .olips·iatic move in cognitive science WQO 80 that we
would,,'f'have to "wait forever" for A completed ecience before
giving an account of intentional statea. The problem was
that ••mantic properti.. like reference could depend on
the outcome of, aay, ohemistry. But it needn't be the case
that the ••mantic feature. of perceptual states whioh enter
into an evaluation of the narrow contents of mental
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states depend on how all of 8cience turns out. They
may, for example, depend only on thing8 like the laws of
optic8 and a theory of transduction. If the way in which
perception enters into narrow content is thought of not as
diectly presenting referents, but as presenting
80mething like ob8ervational presentations of objeots, a
theory of the "hidden essences u of object8 may not be at all
relevant. You wouldn't need a theory of the connection of
thoughts to their referents, but one of the connection of
perceptual states to the observationally salient properties
of objects. Now perhaps there's no such theory, or no
u8able notion of "observationally salient properties of
objects. •• But on the other hand, maybe there is. [42] Let • 8
see if 8omebody comes up with one. If there is one, then
although the notion of content in cognitive science may not
be "preeuppositonle88" in the senae discussed earlier, at
leaat it doesn't presuppose ~verthing just an ideal
theory of peychophyaice.
Question (2). If this 1s right, what's the other
(non-p8ychophyalcal) component of a theory of narrow
content? An account of corl~J.ptual roles, of course -- i. e.
a story about the noematic structures. Perhaps the notion
of noematic content doesn't capture narrow content on the
whole, but it may well be exactly the sort of thing to be
lo~k.d at in con8idering that aspect of narrow content whioh
!! indepen4ent of external oonsiderations. From this
level of analyeia, the aspect of the contents of peroeptual
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representations dependent on their psychophisical ties with
objects would be bracketed not denied, but simply
excluded from the theory of computational activity.
Time to stop and draw the moral. The moral is that if
this way of looking at things has any plausibility, we are
then once again seeing the general notion of meaning broken
down into distinct (and hopefully more precise) parts.
There 18 not just one notion of meaning here, or even two
( "wide" and "narrow" ) , but now three. I •rn not sure which
road this should suggest that we're on: the one to a more
scientifically precise and clarified notion (or class of
notions), or the one to the utter breakdown and eventual
rejection of the entire class of notions. Perhaps it should
be taken to suggest we're at the crossroads. Too bad the
street signs aren't up yet.
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[1] Dreyfus (19S2a), pp. 11-2.
[2) Dreyfus (1982a) , p. 1 •
[3] Husserl (1962), p. 100.
[4] Smith and McIntyre (1982 ) , p. 95.
[5] Dreyfus (1982a), p. 14.
(6] Fodor (1980) , p.225.
[7] Fodor ( 19aO) , p. 227.
[8] Fodor (1980) , p. 231.
[9] Fodor (1 9aO), p. 227.
[10J Dreyfus (1982a), pp. 14~5.
[11] Dreyfus (1982a) p. 3.
[12J Busse...-l, p. 100.
[13J Fodor (1980) , p. 247.
(14J Fodor (1 9aO) , P. 248.
page 144
[15J See part 2 of this thesis, "Meaning Psychologized,"
for a discusssion of the meaning holism problem for
conceptual role semantics.
[16J Dreyfus (1982a), p. 20.
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[11] Dreyfus ( 1980) , p. 78.
[18J Dreyfus ( 1982&) , p. 17.
[19] Dreyfus (1982a) , p. 23.
[20J Dreyfus ( 1982a) , p. 23.
[21] Dreyfus (1982a), p. 21. There's an obvious parallel
between this "what we know / what we are" distinction and
the kind of disti~I~tion which Chomsky (1980) makes between
"knowing that" and "k.nowing how". The obvious point: on
Chomsky's way of making the distinction, there's no reason
to think that knowing how isn't to be explained in terms of
the "autonomous" mental realm of computation and
representation.
[22] For a consideration of how this might in fact be the
case, in particular in the case of mental imagery, see BloCK
(1983) •
[23J Dreyfus (1982a), p. 25.
[24] See Fitts and Posner (1967) for a nice discussion of
this ~1nd of skill learning from withing the cognitivistic
framework.
[25] Dreyfus (among others) sometimes lOOKS as though he
wanta to place 80me weight on the differenoes between
consoious and unconscious prooessing -- for example SPEED
in arguing that such unoonscious processing is
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non-representational. For an atractive alternative story
about these differences, see Fodor (1983).
[26] Dreyfus (1982b), p. 108.
[27] Dreyfus (1982a), p. 7.
[28J Dreyfus (1982a), p. 9.
[29J Dreyfus (1982b), p. 122.
[30] Dreyfus (1982b), p. 122.
[31] Dreyfus (1982a), p. 14.
[32] See, e.g-, Dreyfus (1980), p. 19.
[33) Dreyfus (1982b), p. 108.
[34J Dreyfus (1982a), p. 1.
[35] Husserl, p.243.
[36] Dreyfus (1982a), p. 5.
[37] McIntyre (1982), p. 227.
[38] For a nice discussion of this distinction, see Dennett
(1982).
[39J eft Husserl, section 89.
[40J HUB8erl, p. 346.
[41] For my own story here, see part 2 of this thesis,
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"Meaning Psychologized."
page 147
[42] See Fodor (unpublished-c) for a discussion of this.
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